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Trusts No More: Rethinking the Regulation of 
Retirement Savings in the United States 
Natalya Shnitser∗ 
The regulation of private and public pension plans in the United 
States begins with the premise that employer-sponsored plans 
resemble traditional donative, or gift, trusts. Accordingly, the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 
famously “imports” major principles of donative trust law for the 
regulation of private employer-sponsored pension plans. Statutes 
regulating state and local government pension plans likewise 
routinely invoke the structure and standards applicable to donative 
trusts. Judges, in turn, adjudicate by analogy to the common 
law trust. 
This Article identifies the flaws in the analogy and analyzes the 
shortcomings of a regulatory framework that, despite dramatic 
changes in the nature of modern pension benefits, still regards 
employees as gift recipients, grants both settlor and trustee rights to 
employers, and relies increasingly on trust-based fiduciary 
obligations to prevent employers from prioritizing the interests of 
their non-employee stakeholders over the interests of pension 
plan participants. 
Today, the mismatch between the trust-based legal framework 
and the parties’ rights and interests has contributed to the high cost 
of pension fund investing, the significant gaps in pension coverage, 
and the underfunding of public pension plans. As such challenges 
force U.S. policymakers to reconsider how and how much Americans 
save for their retirement, this Article shows that long-term 
retirement security for U.S workers requires a fundamental 
reevaluation of the employer, employee, and government roles in the 
provision and management of retirement assets. 
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the 2015 Law and Society Meeting, the 2014 Seton Hall Employment & Labor Law Scholars’ 
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School Summer Workshop for helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The donative trust, though often lauded for its flexibility and 
fiduciary regime, is an ill-suited model for modern employer-based 
retirement savings arrangements. Historically devised for the transfer 
of private wealth, the prototypical donative trust arises from and is 
structured to effectuate a particular kind of gift transfer in which the 
gift giver selects a third-party trustee to manage the gift on behalf of 
the gift recipient. The protection of the gift giver’s preferences is a 
central goal of modern trust law.1 
 
 1.  See, e.g., 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650 (noting trust law’s “attendant emphasis 
on carrying out the instructions of the settlor”). 
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Pension benefits are not gifts. To the contrary, they are a form of 
deferred compensation paid by employers to recruit and retain 
employees. And yet the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA) famously “imports” major principles of donative 
trust law, including the fiduciary regime traditionally imposed on 
trustees.2 Statutes regulating state and local government pension 
plans likewise routinely invoke the structure and standards 
traditionally applicable to donative trusts. The “trust” label has 
invited legislators and judges to regulate and adjudicate by analogy 
to the traditional donative trust.3 In its 2015 Tibble v. Edison 
decision, the Supreme Court urged the Ninth Circuit to determine 
the scope of the employer’s monitoring obligation while 
“recognizing the importance of analogous trust law.”4 
The reliance on the trust form in employer-sponsored pension 
savings arrangements constitutes part of the trust’s under-analyzed—
and increasingly problematic—“secret life.”5 Leading trust treatises 
acknowledge the appropriation of the trust label outside the donative 
context but refuse to assess the merits of such non-traditional uses of 
 
 2.  Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The 
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (1988); see also John H. Langbein, The 
Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 169 
(1997) (noting that “ERISA’s legislative history makes clear that Congress meant to track the 
common law of trusts”). 
 3.  See, e.g., Beck v. PACE Int’l Union, 551 U.S. 96, 101 (2007) (noting that 
determination as to the employer’s liability “is an inquiry that is aided by the common law of 
trusts which serves as ERISA’s backdrop”); see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 
(1996) (“[W]e recognize that these fiduciary duties draw much of their content from the 
common law of trusts, the law that governed most benefit plans before ERISA’s enactment.”); 
Cent. States v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985) (“[R]ather than explicitly 
enumerating all of the powers and duties of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked 
the common law of trusts to define the general scope of their authority and responsibility.”); 
Definition of the term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 
81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509, 2510, and 2550) 
(“ERISA safeguards plan participants by imposing trust law standards of care and undivided 
loyalty on plan fiduciaries, and by holding fiduciaries accountable when they breach 
those obligations.”). 
 4.  Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1829 (2015). 
 5.  Langbein, supra note 2 at 166 (“It will be seen that well over 90% of the money 
held in trust in the United States is in commercial trusts as opposed to personal trusts.”); see 
also Paul B. Miller, The Future for Business Trusts: A Comparative Analysis of Canadian and 
American Uniform Legislation, 36 QUEEN’S L.J. 443 (2011); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust As 
“Uncorporation”: A Research Agenda, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 31, 34 (2005) (observing that 
“the business trust is something of an orphan in the domestic legal academy”). 
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the trust form.6 Scholars have analyzed—and criticized—the initial 
adoption of the trust form for the traditional defined benefit private-
sector pension plans prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s. The changes 
in the pension landscape over the last two decades, however, have 
rendered the analysis incomplete. 
Trust law was not intended to play a major role in the 
governance of U.S. public and private pension plans. When Congress 
borrowed from donative trust law in the 1970s, it did so for the 
limited purpose of curbing asset mismanagement—or “internal 
defalcation”—by insiders with access to funds set aside to pay 
employee pensions.7 At the time, employers generally promised 
traditional defined benefit pensions to their employees, and also bore 
the risk and responsibility of setting aside and managing the money 
to pay for such benefits. In passing ERISA, Congress looked to trust 
law to protect pension assets, but simultaneously imposed extensive 
vesting, funding, and insurance requirements to regulate employer 
conduct in the provision and administration of defined benefit 
pension plans. 
Trust law—and particularly the fiduciary regime—inadvertently 
assumed a much greater governance role as the pension landscape 
evolved in the decades after ERISA’s passage. As defined benefit 
plans in the private sector gave way to defined contribution 
arrangements, and as defined benefit public pension plans expanded 
in size and coverage,8 many of ERISA’s substantive provisions lost 
 
 6.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2003) 
(“The law relating to the use of trusts as devices for conducting business and investment 
activities outside the express private- and charitable-trust context is not within the scope of this 
Restatement. Although many rules of trust law may also apply to business and investment 
trusts, many of these rules do not; instead other rules are drawn from other bodies of law that 
are specially applicable to those activities even when conducted in trust form. Thus, the 
business trust is a business arrangement that is best dealt with in connection with business 
associations; and most pooled investment vehicles are properly governed by laws applicable to 
investment companies and to the issuance and sale of securities.”). The Uniform Trust Code is 
also directed “primarily at trusts that arise in an estate planning or other donative context,” but 
acknowledges that “express trusts can arise in other contexts . . . . Commercial trusts come in 
numerous forms, including trusts created pursuant to a state business trust act and trusts 
created to administer specified funds, such as to pay a pension or to manage pooled 
investments. Commercial trusts are often subject to special-purpose legislation and case law, 
which in some respects displace the usual rules stated in this Code.” UNIF. TRUST CODE 
§ 102 cmt. (2000). 
 7.  Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2 at 1110.  
 8.  In a defined contribution plan, an employee’s benefits during retirement are not 
fixed, but depend on the contributions made by the employee and/or employer to the 
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relevance. At the same time, employee participants became 
increasingly exposed to the plan management, investment, and 
funding decisions of their employers. In the absence of applicable 
substantive regulation, the trust-based fiduciary regime took on a 
prominent role in regulating employer and employee conduct in the 
provision of retirement benefits. 
Is trust law well suited for this leading role? This Article suggests 
that the answer is no. The structural differences that have emerged 
between traditional donative trusts and modern pension plans 
undermine the effectiveness of trust law’s protective fiduciary regime 
and its ability to safeguard the retirement security of 
America’s workers. 
In the prototypical donative trust, an owner of property, called 
the settlor, wishes to gift the property to one or more beneficiaries. 
Rather than giving a direct gift to the beneficiary, the settlor wishes 
to have the property managed by a third party serving as trustee.9 
The settlor enters into a management agreement with the trustee 
and transfers to the trustee the legal title to the property. The 
settlor’s rights with respect to the trust property terminate, the 
trustee retains legal control, and the beneficiary receives an equitable 
interest. The beneficiary cannot easily transfer the equitable interest 
or exercise meaningful control over the trustee.10 To protect the 
beneficiary from trustee misconduct, trust law subjects the trustees 
 
employee’s account, as well as the investment performance of the assets in that account. An 
employee in a defined contribution plan will ultimately receive the nonforfeitable accrued 
balance in his or her account, which is based on contributions plus or minus investment gains 
or losses. In contrast, a defined benefit plan promises a specified monthly benefit at retirement, 
which is typically based on the final average salary and the number of years worked for a 
particular employer. While an employee may have to contribute a portion of his or her earnings 
to a defined benefit plan, the employer is responsible for managing the assets and ensuring that 
the benefits will be paid. See also infra Part II. 
 9.  The settlor, trustee, and beneficiary roles do not necessitate three different persons 
as parties to the trust. One person can wear two hats, or sometimes even all three. The trustee, 
however, must owe equitable duties to someone other than himself. UNIF. TRUST CODE 
§ 402 (2000). 
 10.  Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. 
CORP. L. 565, 570–71 (2003) (observing that “donative trust beneficiaries are awarded their 
stake in the trust by the donative fiat of the settlor, and there is no well-developed aftermarket 
for the beneficiaries’ interests . . . . Moreover, trust beneficiaries cannot easily replace the 
trustees. Both of these limits on the beneficiaries’ control are designed to give effect to the 
preferences of the settlor, thereby facilitating the donative trust’s often (but not exclusively) 
paternalistic function.”). 
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to strict fiduciary obligations, including the duty of loyalty and the 
duty of prudence. 
Non-donative trust arrangements—including pension plans—
deviate from these characteristics in fundamental ways. The 
traditional settlor, trustee, and beneficiary roles do not map well 
onto modern pension arrangements; instead, both employers and 
employees take on elements of each role. Under existing regulation, 
employers do not have to establish any kind of pension plan for their 
employees. They take on the “settlor” role of setting up a plan only 
if the benefits to the employer—typically in the form of recruitment 
and retention gains—exceed the employer’s costs. And just as 
employers share the beneficiary role with employees, by contributing 
a portion of their compensation to the pension plans, employees take 
on the settlor role alongside employers. 
The trustee role is also shared by employers and employees. 
Employee participants in defined contribution plans choose how to 
invest their retirement assets from among investment options 
selected by their employers. Participants in public-sector defined 
benefit plans have certain voting rights with respect to the selection 
and oversight of plan trustees. In both the public and private sectors, 
pension law tasks employers—who have a clear interest in 
maximizing the benefits to the employers—with certain trustee-like 
responsibilities over the plans.11 Thus, as the settlors, employers 
decide whether or not to establish a pension plan in the first place, 
and set both the terms of the plan and the magnitude of any 
employer contributions to the plan. As the trustees, employers must 
then disregard their own beneficiary interests and serve as fiduciaries 
of the employee-beneficiaries. 
Despite these overlapping roles, the governance of modern 
pension plans relies heavily on the tools of trust law, and especially 
the trust-based fiduciary regime. As this Article suggests, however, 
the current trust-based governance regime for pension plans does 
not—and could not—properly recognize the interests and incentives 
of employers and employees. The traditional donative trust is 
premised upon the existence of clearly defined settlor preferences 
and provides no mechanism for adjudicating between competing 
interests of settlors, particularly where such settlors are also the 
beneficiaries of the trust. The current trust-based regime therefore 
 
 11.  Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2 at 1126–28. 
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necessarily oversimplifies the interests of the parties to the pension 
trust. The statutory framework and case law regard employees as 
beneficiaries, while sweeping over their role as earners of the assets 
that are contributed into the trusts. The same trust-based framework 
treats employers as both the settlors and the trustees of the pension 
trusts, but effectively ignores their interest in minimizing the 
employer costs associated with the plans. 
In the case of defined contribution plans, which are the 
dominant form of retirement savings today, the notion of the 
employer as a fiduciary to its employees has been in tension with the 
fiduciary obligations owed to the corporate shareholders. 
Enforcement of the employers’ fiduciary obligations to employees 
has been limited by the courts’ deference to the preferences of 
employers as settlors, while the employee-as-beneficiary framework 
has perpetuated the kind of beneficiary “lock-in” characteristic of 
donative trusts. By restricting employees to the pension plan terms 
selected by a particular employer, the trust-based framework has left 
employee “beneficiaries” at the mercy of their employer “trustees” 
for critical decisions regarding the management and investment of 
money set aside for retirement. Although such limitations may be 
appropriate for gift recipients, they have inappropriately caused 
employees to forego hundreds of millions of dollars in investment 
returns as a result of suboptimal investment menus and service-
provider arrangements constructed by the employers.12 Meanwhile, 
the trust-based “gift” paradigm has also led to significant gaps in 
coverage. With many private U.S. employers choosing not to provide 
the “gift” of pensions to their employees, some sixty-eight million 
workers are without access to an employer-sponsored plan.13 
 
 12.  See Chris Arnold, Is Wall Street Eating Your 401(k) Nest Egg?, NPR (Oct. 19, 
2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/10/19/445322138/is-wall-street-eating-your-401-k-
nest-egg (noting that “Americans collectively are losing billions of dollars a year out of their 
retirement accounts because they’re paying excessive fees”); infra Section IV.A.2. 
 13.  See Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 
80 Fed. Reg. 72006 (proposed Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510); see also 
Craig Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation: Geographic Differences and 
Trends, 2012, EMP. BENEFITS RES. INST, No. 293, Nov. 2013, at 9, 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_011-13.No392.Particip.pdf (noting that “[a]mong 
the 156.5 million Americans who worked in 2012, 76.0 million worked for employers or 
unions that sponsored a pension or retirement plan, and 61.6 million participated in a plan,” 
which translates into a sponsorship rate of 48.6 percent). 
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In the case of public-sector pension plans, most of which still 
take the traditional defined-benefit form, the trust-based fiduciary 
regime has failed to ensure that government promises of pension 
benefits are actually funded. The tenets of donative trust law have 
not limited the ability of legislative “settlors” to make payout 
promises that greatly exceed the trusts’ assets, with the current gap 
approaching several trillion dollars.14 As in the private defined 
contribution arrangements, the donative trust model has deferred to 
conflicted trustees while treating employees who make contributions 
into the pension trusts as gift recipients with limited control over the 
trust assets or their interests in the trusts. 
To be clear, analogizing to trust law may improve participant 
outcomes in certain cases and, under the status quo, it may be at 
times the best strategy for plaintiffs seeking to challenge employer 
actions (or inaction).15 In the long-term however, the donative trust 
paradigm fails to facilitate universal access to low-cost retirement 
savings products, which is critical to retirement security in the 
United States. After reviewing the range of recently enacted and 
proposed reforms—all of which implicitly acknowledge the 
limitations of the current trust-based model—this Article suggests 
that the fiduciary regime, though reflexively invoked by the trust 
label,16 should no longer be the centerpiece of retirement plan 
governance. Drawing on lessons from the regulation of investment 
companies, this Article outlines a research agenda for a national 
system of individual retirement savings accounts to track and 
administer individual retirement savings throughout an individual’s 
lifetime and across all employers. As it has done in other 
jurisdictions, the individual account system would free employers 
from their trustee roles. Public and private employers would 
continue to make contributions on behalf of employees but would 
 
 14.  Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, The Crisis in Local Government Pensions in the 
United States, in GROWING OLD: PAYING FOR RETIREMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL MONEY 
MANAGEMENT AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 47 (Yasuyuki Fuchita et al. eds., 2011). 
 15.  See, e.g., Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Tibble v. 
Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823 (2015) (No.13-550), 2014 WL 7783960 (citing extensively to 
trust law authorities to show that participants’ claims are not barred by ERISA’s statute of 
limitations because ERISA fiduciaries, like donative trust trustees, have an ongoing duty to 
monitor plan investments). 
 16. Langbein, supra note 2 at 182 (noting that “the trust automatically invokes the 
distinctive protective regime of trust fiduciary law for safeguarding the interests of investors or 
other beneficiaries”). 
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not be tasked with plan design or administration. Employees would 
select from among readily comparable options the investments for 
their retirement account assets. Instead of relying primarily on 
fiduciary law to discipline pension plan providers, the individual 
account model would treat pension plans as products subject to 
safety and standards regulation, and, in turn, to the disciplining 
power of consumer choice. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes how donative 
trust law came to govern modern pension plans and compares the 
traditional donative trust to modern day retirement savings 
arrangements. Part III reviews the existing scholarship and explains 
the need for a revised assessment. Part IV shows how the reliance on 
the donative trust model of regulation has contributed to the high 
cost of pension fund investing, the gaps in pension coverage, and the 
underfunding of public pension plans. Part V analyzes recently 
proposed and enacted changes and introduces long-term reforms to 
properly recognize employer, employee, and government incentives 
in the provision and management of retirement assets. Part VI 
concludes. 
II. HOW DONATIVE TRUST LAW CAME TO GOVERN MODERN 
PENSION PLANS 
How did the trust—long considered the characteristic device for 
organizing intergenerational wealth transmission—come to play such 
a prominent role in the regulation of public and private pension 
plans?17 What made trust law an appealing model for the Treasury, 
for state legislators, and for the drafters of ERISA? The answer lies in 
two prominent features of the common law trust: first, its ability to 
shield a pool of assets for a particular purpose or person,18 and 
second, the protective regime of trust fiduciary law.19 Each feature is 
discussed in turn below. 
 
 17.  See Langbein, supra note 2 at 165. 
 18.  See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, Trust Law in the United States. A Basic 
Study of Its Special Contribution, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 133, 134 (1998) (arguing that “the 
most important contribution of the law of trusts is that it facilitates the partitioning of assets 
into bundles that can conveniently be pledged separately to different classes of creditors. Of 
particular importance in this respect is the use of trust law to shield trust assets from claims of 
the trustee’s personal creditors.”). 
 19.  Langbein, supra note 2, at 182. 
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A. The Donative Trust 
A trust is an arrangement in which a settlor engages a trustee to 
manage property as a fiduciary for one or more beneficiaries. 
Although that definition does not in itself situate the trust in any 
particular context and, indeed, variations of the trust form have been 
adopted for a wide range of commercial purposes, in the culture of 
Anglo-American law, the trust is considered a branch of the law of 
gratuitous transfers.20 Having originated at the end of the Middle 
Ages as a means of transferring wealth within the family, the trust 
remains the characteristic device for organizing intergenerational 
wealth transmission and is regarded as “essentially a gift, projected 
on the plane of time and so subjected to a management regime.”21 
In a prototypical trust, a settlor wishes to gift property to a 
beneficiary. Under the Uniform Trust Code, a settlor is “a 
person . . . who creates, or contributes property to, a trust.”22 Often 
the intended beneficiary is a minor or someone who the settlor 
believes may not be well suited to manage the property.23 Therefore, 
rather than make a gift directly to the beneficiary, the settlor places 
control of the property in the hands of an intermediary to manage 
the property on behalf of the beneficiary. Trust law permits the 
settlor, as the owner of the property with absolute freedom to give it 
away as he or she prefers, to effect almost any management and 
distribution arrangement that the settlor desires.24 Importantly, 
however, unless the settlor explicitly retains an interest in the trust, 
the settlor’s legal interest in the trust terminates once the trust 
is formed.25 
 
 20.  Id. at 165. 
 21.  Id. at 185 (citing Bernard Rudden, John P. Dawson’s Gifts and Promises, 44 MOD L. 
REV. 610, 610 (1981) (book review)). 
 22.  If more than one person creates or contributes property to a trust, each person is a 
settlor of the portion of the trust property that is attributable to that person’s contribution and 
that may only be revoked by that person. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103 (2000). 
 23.  Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2 at 1114. 
 24.  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 401 (2000). Deviation from either an administrative or 
dispositive term of the trust is generally permitted only where such deviation will further the 
purposes of the trust. Id. § 412; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 (AM. LAW INST. 
2003); see also Langbein, supra note 2, at 184. 
 25.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94 cmt. d(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2003) 
(“Neither the settlor of a private trust nor the personal representative or successors in interest 
of the settlor can, as such, maintain a suit against the trustee to enjoin or redress a breach of 
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Upon the formation of the trust, the beneficiary acquires an 
equitable interest in the trust while the trustee acquires the legal 
title. The assets in the trust are segregated from both the assets of 
the beneficiary and the assets of the trustee.26 The beneficiary can 
neither freely transfer the trust interest,27 nor, under the default trust 
rules, replace the trustee without court approval (and even then, 
only for cause).28 Indeed, to enforce the trustee obligations, the 
beneficiary must pursue remedies in court.29 These limits on control 
and exit promote the donative trust’s “paternalistic function.”30 
In the resulting arrangement, the beneficiary’s fortunes depend 
on the trustee: if trust property is managed wisely, the beneficiary 
reaps the gains, and if the trust property is managed poorly, the 
beneficiary suffers the losses. In the absence of market-based checks 
on the trustee, the beneficiary of the modern donative trust is 
protected primarily by trust fiduciary law—particularly the duties of 
prudence and loyalty—which have replaced historic restrictions on 
trustee authority.31 The duty of prudence requires the trustee to 
administer the trust “as a prudent person would, in light of the 
 
trust or otherwise to enforce the trust, absent contrary legislation. This does not, however, 
preclude settlor-standing based on a retained beneficial power or interest.”). 
 26.  See, e.g., Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 18 at 134, 145. 
 27.  John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best 
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 962 (2005) (“There is no counterpart in trusteeship to the 
market for corporate control . . . . Interests in trusts are commonly inalienable, both on 
account of legal restrictions and because of practical impediments to valuing and marketing 
contingent interests.”); Sitkoff, supra note 10, at 570 (noting that “there is no well-developed 
aftermarket for the beneficiaries’ interests” and that “in many American trusts the beneficiaries 
are disabled by so-called ‘spendthrift’ clauses from alienating (even involuntarily) their interest 
in the trust”). 
 28.  See e.g., JOHN R. PRICE, PRICE ON CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING 1165 (2d 
ed. 2000) (noting that “it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the judicial removal of a 
trustee unless the trustee has engaged in an egregious breach of trust”). 
 29.  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706(a) (2000) (“The settlors, a cotrustee, or a beneficiary 
may request the court to remove a trustee, or a trustee may be removed by the court on its 
own initiative.”); id. § 1001(b) (setting forth the remedies that a court may impose for a 
breach of trust). 
 30.  Sitkoff, supra note 10 at 571; John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: 
A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1272 (2014) 
(noting that settlors impose restrictions in order to protect beneficiaries from themselves or 
from others). 
 31.  See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 
625, 641 (1995) (“The need for active administration of the modem trust portfolio of 
financial assets rendered obsolete this scheme of disempowering the trustee to transact with 
the trust property.”). 
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purposes, terms, and other circumstances of the trust” and with the 
“exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution.”32 The duty of loyalty 
demands administration solely in the interest of the beneficiary and 
prohibits the trustee from self-dealing with trust assets and from 
partaking in any conflict-of-interest transactions.33 In addition to 
making voidable all transactions in which the trustee has a conflict, 
the loyalty standard also includes the duty of impartiality, which 
applies if the trust has two or more beneficiaries. In deciding how to 
invest, manage, and distribute the trust property, the trustee must 
act impartially and “giv[e] due regard to the beneficiaries’ 
respective interests.”34 
In sum, the quintessential donative trust facilitates the 
conditioned transfer of gifts, and in particular, the intergenerational 
transfer of family wealth. Although various commercial enterprises 
have adopted modified versions of the trust form and have relied on 
certain elements of trust fiduciary law, pension funds have gone the 
furthest in structuring multiparty commercial arrangements by 
analogy to the private donative trust. As Section II.B. infra 
describes, key elements of the law developed primarily to regulate 
the behavior of donative trust settlors, beneficiaries, and trustees 
now permeate the statutory regime governing U.S. pension plans. 
B. Private-Sector Defined Benefit Pension Plans 
The use of the trust form for private-sector pension 
arrangements dates as far back as 1919 when the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue conditioned the deductibility of employer contributions for 
accrued pension expenses on the segregation of those contributions 
in a trust “organized entirely separate and distinct from the 
corporation . . . legal title of which [could] not remain in the 
 
 32.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 33.  The duty of loyalty is prophylactic in its approach. Langbein, supra note 31, at 656. 
It presumptively makes voidable any transactions in which the trustee acts for its own account, 
unless the conflict of interest is authorized by the settlor, approved by the beneficiaries, or 
granted advance judicial approval. Barring such approval, once the beneficiaries prove the 
existence of self-dealing, there is “no further inquiry.” See, e.g.¸ UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 cmt. 
(2000) (“Such transactions are irrebuttably presumed to be affected by a conflict between 
personal and fiduciary interests. It is immaterial whether the trustee acts in good faith or pays a 
fair consideration.”). 
 34.  Id. § 803 (2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
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corporation.”35 The Revenue Act of 1921 further required that 
pension trusts wishing to avoid taxation be created “for the exclusive 
benefit” of the employees.36 Thus, preferential federal tax treatment 
was conditioned on the use of the trust form to segregate the assets 
for employee pensions from the general assets of the employer. 
The tax rules did not, however, impose substantive restrictions 
on the nature of pension benefits. Indeed, most employers that 
offered pensions to their employees paid them out of current 
income, took careful precautions to retain the right to change or 
terminate benefits, and intentionally referred to such benefits as 
“gifts” whose continuation depended on the fortune of the 
employer.37 To the extent that pensions encouraged younger 
employees to stick with an employer (through vesting requirements) 
and older employees to retire, they were seen by employers primarily 
as means of “managing workers.”38 
Employer interest in pensions soared during World War II when 
the National War Labor Board restricted increases in cash 
compensation.39 In the post-war period, employers typically adopted 
defined benefit pension plans that promised their employees fixed 
monthly benefits—a check in the mail—from the time of retirement 
until death. Despite such promises, in the 1950s and 1960s, many 
employers failed to set aside adequate assets to pay for the promised 
benefits, often leaving employees empty-handed when financial 
fortunes turned south.40 To the extent money was set aside, it made 
for a tempting target for unscrupulous insiders with access to the 
funds. Evidence of looting by union leaders charged with pension 
 
 35.  JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 
1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 25 (2004). 
 36.  Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 219(f), Pub. L. No. 42-98, 42 Stat. 227, 247. 
 37.  Standard boilerplate plan language included the following: 
The allowances are voluntary gifts from the company and constitute no contract and 
confer no legal rights upon any employee. The continuance of the retirement 
allowance depends upon the earnings of the company and the allowances may at any 
time be reduced, suspended, or discontinued on that, or any other account, at the 
option of the Board of Directors. 
JOHN LANGBEIN, DAVID PRATT & SUSAN STABILE, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 9 
(5th ed. 2010). 
 38.  WOOTEN, supra note 35, at 4. 
 39.  LANGBEIN, supra note 37, at 13. 
 40.  Id. at 51–79. 
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fund administration made headlines in the national press and helped 
usher in a movement for pension reform.41 
The reform effort culminated with the passage of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974. ERISA sought to 
address three main risks associated with defined benefit plans in the 
private sector: first, that plan officials would steal or misuse plan 
pension fund assets; second, that employees would lose their 
pensions if they were fired or quit before meeting the extensive and 
idiosyncratic vesting requirements commonly imposed by employers; 
and third, that employers would not set aside enough money to pay 
for the promised benefits, thus endangering the benefits of 
employees whose firms terminated the plan or went bankrupt.42 To 
address the latter two risks, ERISA mandated minimum funding 
standards, required plans to participate in a termination insurance 
program, and imposed minimum vesting standards that granted 
employees “a legal right to benefits” after a period of service 
specified in the statute.”43 
To address the looting and mismanagement that had previously 
plagued private pensions, the drafters of ERISA turned, in part, to 
trust law, whose common law fiduciary regime had evolved to 
protect beneficiaries from mismanagement by trustees.44 Although 
some have described this move as a mere afterthought, added only in 
later versions of the bill,45 the final version of ERISA incorporated 
the “rules and remedies similar to those under traditional trust 
law.”46 The trust-law duty of loyalty became the centerpiece of 
 
 41.  As Fischel and Langbein note, “In the 1950s and 1960s, investigative hearings on 
the subject of labor union racketeering . . . achieved immense notoriety.” Fischel & Langbein, 
supra note 2, at 1110. 
 42.  WOOTEN, supra note 35, at 5. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Fischel & Langbein observe that the drafters sought to protect pension funds 
against “internal defalcation.” Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2, at 1110. 
 45.  Frank Cummings, Panel Discussion, ERISA and the Fiduciary, Symposium, ERISA 
at 40: What Were They Thinking?, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 359, 376 (2014) (noting that the 
fiduciary provisions were essentially stapled on after the substantive rules had already been 
drafted); see also Henry Rose, Panel Discussion, Setting the Stage: History Before the Ninety-
Third Congress, Symposium, ERISA at 40: What Were They Thinking?, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 265, 
280 (2014) (noting that early bills “didn’t attend to fiduciary issues in any detail”). 
 46. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 295 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5038, 5076. 
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ERISA fiduciary requirements.47 The drafters of ERISA also 
incorporated the prudent man standard of care for trust 
administration and the requirement that plan assets be diversified.48 
Though controversial, the trust-based fiduciary regime was 
relatively inconsequential in the context of defined benefit pension 
plans. ERISA’s substantive rules significantly limited the discretion of 
defined benefit plan administrators. For example, not only did 
ERISA subject plan sponsors to statutory funding requirements and 
a mandatory federal insurance scheme, it also sought to limit the 
misuse of plan assets by explicitly prohibiting transactions between 
an employee benefit plan and parties that had a pre-existing 
relationship with the plan.49 Although such transactions would also 
be prohibited under the fiduciary standard, ERISA’s drafters chose 
to rely on an explicit ban rather than a mere fiduciary obligation. 
Indeed, the prohibited transaction provisions, together with the 
mandatory vesting, funding, and insurance rules, reflected the 
understanding that trust law alone was inadequate to protect the 
interests of plan participants and beneficiaries.50 
The role of the fiduciary regime was also limited by the very 
design of the then-prevalent private-sector defined benefit pension 
plans. Employee pension benefits were generally fixed as a 
percentage of salary (for example, sixty percent of final average 
salary) and did not depend on the investment returns generated by 
the trust assets. Employers bore the investment risk and were subject 
to statutory funding requirements and a mandatory federal insurance 
scheme. The asset management practices that the trust-based 
fiduciary regime was intended to regulate were “seldom of concern” 
to participants in defined benefit plans.51 
 
 47.  See e.g., Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy 
of the ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. REV. 459, 462 (2015). 
 48.  Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2, at 1008. 
 49.  Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106. 
 50.  See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (“After all, ERISA’s standards 
and procedural protections partly reflect a congressional determination that the common law 
of trusts did not offer completely satisfactory protection.”); 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650 
(“[E]ven where the funding mechanism of the plan is in the form of a trust, reliance on 
conventional trust law often is insufficient to adequately protect the interests of plan 
participants and beneficiaries.”). 
 51.  John H. Langbein, The Conundrum of Fiduciary Investing under ERISA, in 
PENSION RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROXY VOTING OF PENSION PLAN EQUITY SECURITIES 132 
(Dan M. McGill ed., 1989); see also Norman Stein, Trust Law and Pension Plans, in PENSION 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROXY VOTING OF PENSION PLAN EQUITY SECURITIES 52 (Dan M. 
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C. Private-Sector Defined Contribution Pension Plans 
Over the last four decades, private-sector employers have 
gradually ceased to offer defined benefit plans and have shifted to 
employer-sponsored, employee-directed arrangements.52 Today, 
employees shoulder the investment risk and bear the costs of 
imprudent or self-serving employer decisions with respect to the 
design and management of the plans. Under the typical 401(k) 
participant-directed plan, employees elect to defer pre-tax earnings 
to what are effectively individual investment accounts.53 Employers 
may also make contributions to the employees’ accounts. Employees 
then select how to invest the funds in their accounts using menus of 
investment options and terms selected by their employers. However 
the investments perform, the employees bear the entire investment 
risk: at retirement, employees are entitled to receive only the 
amounts that have accumulated in their individual accounts. 
 
McGill ed., 1989) (noting that “it is possible that the employer has the ability to pass a part of 
[the poor returns and of capital losses] to the employee-participants either by reducing wages, 
future benefit accruals, or other concessions.”). 
 52.  Scholars like Edward Zelinsky posit that ERISA unintentionally “started the trend 
toward the defined contribution society as we know it today.” See Edward A. Zelinsky, The 
Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 471 (2004). He argues that ERISA’s 
“regulatory burdens” on defined benefit plans made the “more flexible defined contribution 
devices . . . more attractive to employers.” Id. at 471–72. Also, “ERISA’s fiduciary rules 
incented employers to shift to self-directed defined contribution arrangements under which 
participants control the investment of their own retirement resources.” Id.; see also Alicia 
Munnell, Private Sector Defined Benefit Plans Vanishing, MARKETWATCH.COM (Dec. 30, 
2011), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/encore/2011/12/30/private-sector-pensions-are-
really-disappearing/ (observing that defined benefit plans in the private sector are disappearing 
and noting that only 13 Fortune 100 companies offered new employees a traditional defined 
benefit plan in 2011, compared to 58 in 2000). The assets held in defined contribution plans 
have grown from $385 billion in 1990 to approximately $6.5 trillion by 2015, with $4.5 
trillion held in 401(k) plans. See Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities 
Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1983 (2010); Investment Company Institute, 
Retirement Assets Total $23.5 Trillion in Third Quarter 2015, 
https://www.ici.org/research/stats/retirement/ret_15_q3. 
 53.  Section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) permits employees to defer 
recognition of the amounts contributed into the plans and of the investment gains until such 
amounts are distributed from the plan, typically upon retirement. Employer contributions are 
deductible on the employer’s federal income tax return to the extent that the contributions do 
not exceed the specified contribution limitations. I.R.C. §§ 404, 415 (2012). Although this 
Article refers to 401(k) plans, the same analysis generally applies to 403(b) plans and 457 
plans. IRC § 403 and IRC § 457 provide for similar salary-deferral arrangements for public 
schools, certain 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations, and state and local governments. 
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Though not designed for such plans, ERISA’s donative trust 
framework nevertheless applies. The statute and corresponding 
regulation generally require that plan assets be held in trust by one 
or more trustees and used only to benefit the participants or to pay 
reasonable plan expenses.54 Moreover, because ERISA extends its 
trustee-like fiduciary standards to anyone that has discretionary 
authority or control respecting management of plan assets, or 
discretionary authority or responsibility in the administration of the 
plan, employers assume fiduciary status with respect to the plan.55 
The 401(k) arrangement also adopts the lock-in feature of the 
donative trust.56 Just as donative trust beneficiaries generally cannot 
transfer or sell their trust interests, 401(k) participants cannot assign 
or alienate benefits. Employees are severely restricted in their ability 
to withdraw money from 401(k) plans while employed by the plan 
sponsor.57 Nor can employees simply avoid the plan terms selected by 
their employers by setting up Individual Retirement Accounts 
(IRAs).58 If an employer provides any kind of retirement plan, then 
 
 54.  Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §§ 403–04, 29 U.S.C. § 
1104(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012) (Section 403(b) provides limited exceptions to the 
trust requirement). 
 55.  Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) 
(2012). For a discussion of recent efforts to “outsource” fiduciary responsibility, see infra note 
96 and accompanying text. 
 56.  See, e.g.,  Anne M. Tucker, Locked In: The Competitive Disadvantage of Citizen 
Shareholders, 125 Yale L.J. F. 163 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/locked-in-
the-competitive-disadvantage-of-citizen-shareholders (emphasizing that “exit is not a viable 
option” for participants in 401(k) plans). 
 57. Rules under IRC § 401(k)(2)(B) restrict the distribution of assets from 401(k) 
plans. Distributions may not be taken unless the employee severs employment, dies, becomes 
disabled, faces certain hardships, turns 59 1/2, meets reservist deployment requirements, or if 
the plan itself is terminated by the employer. 26 U.S.C. § 72(t)(2) (2012). Distributions that 
do not meet these terms are subject to immediate taxation, as well as additional 10% tax. 26 
U.S.C. § 72(t)(1) (2012). Apart from the tax consequences, certain distribution options are 
left to the discretion of the plan sponsor. Employers decide, for example, whether or not to 
permit hardship distributions or distributions to employee participants who have attained the 
age of 59 1/2. IRC § 401(k)(2)(B)(i)(IV); Treas, Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(ii). 
 58.  The regulation of IRAs is also the subject of great debate, albeit one that is not 
explored in this Article. The Department of Labor has expanded the definition of “fiduciary” 
under ERISA to include, for the first time, those who provide investment advice to IRA 
owners. Notably, the regulation permits “fiduciaries” who meet certain conduct and disclosure 
requirement to continue to operate with conflicts of interest. See definition of the term 
“Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 
(Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509, 2510, and 2550). 
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its employees cannot access the same federal tax benefits outside the 
employer plan.59 
Most importantly, because ERISA provides relatively fewer 
substantive rules for defined contribution plans, trust-based fiduciary 
obligations now play a far greater governance role.60 As discussed in 
Section IV below, employers, together with other service providers 
who exercise discretionary control or authority over the management 
of plan assets, are subject to the “catchall” fiduciary obligations of 
loyalty and prudence, the scope of which is commonly determined 
by analogy to the donative trust.61 
D. Public-Sector Pension Plans 
Trust law also figures prominently and problematically in the 
management of U.S. public pension plans, which today cover 
approximately twenty-seven million public-sector employees, 
retirees, and beneficiaries.62 Although state and local governments 
are increasingly experimenting with defined contribution 
arrangements, for now, most public plans are defined benefit 
arrangements that promise fixed monthly benefits to retirees.63 
 
 59.  The Individual Retirement Account (IRA) does permit individuals to save for 
retirement in individual tax preferred accounts that are not associated with any employer. 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CAT. NO. 15160X, PUBLICATION 590: INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT 
ARRANGEMENTS (IRAS) 7 (2013). However, the Internal Revenue Code limits the maximum 
contributions to such plans (below the limit for contributions to employer sponsored plans) 
and limits the deductibility of such contributions. See id. at 14. 
 60.  See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher, Regulating Employment-Based Anything, 99 MINN. L. 
REV. 15 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2581329 (observing that for defined contribution plans, “ERISA 
regulation is of a more modest character”); see also Dana M. Muir, Revenue Sharing in 401(k) 
Plans: Employers as Monitors?, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 485, 487 (2014) (noting that “the 
governing fiduciary framework has not adapted to the increased importance and complexity of 
401(k) plans”). 
 61.  Dana M. Muir, Decentralized Enforcement to Combat Financial Wrongdoing in 
Pensions, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 46 (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the American 
Business Law Journal) (describing ERISA’s fiduciary provisions “as an indispensable catchall to 
prohibit harmful conduct that is imprudent or contrary to the best interests of participants but 
is not otherwise prohibited by the statute or regulations”). 
 62.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-322, STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT PENSION PLANS: ECONOMIC DOWNTURN SPURS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS COSTS 
AND SUSTAINABILITY 1 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589043.pdf. 
 63. Alicia H. Munnell, Jean-Pierre Aubry, and Mark Cafarelli, Defined Contribution 
Plans in the Public Sector: An Update, CENTER FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOV. 
EXCELLENCE (2014). 
http://www.nasra.org/files/Topical%20Reports/Plan%20Design/Defined_Contribution_Pla
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ERISA explicitly does not cover public pension plans, but the 
trust form is statutorily mandated by most state and local 
governments, who both make the pension promises and are also in 
charge of putting aside the money to fund such long-term 
obligations.64 To manage and administer pension plans, state and 
local governments typically set up pension systems, which are 
separate legal entities governed by boards of trustees.65 The trustees 
are either appointed by elected officials or elected by plan 
participants.66 By statutory design, the trustees are charged with 
“plan administration” and, in most cases, given discretion over the 
investment of assets set aside in public pension trusts.67 Although 
exact statutory requirements vary across states, public plan trustees 
are generally subject to the traditional trust law duties of prudence 
and loyalty.68 In cases of alleged fiduciary breach, state courts have 
 
ns_An_Update.pdf (“Most state and local workers are covered by a traditional defined benefit 
plan”). Such benefits are often calculated through a formula that considers final salary and 
years of service. For example, a worker might be entitled at retirement to two percent of final 
average salary for each year worked. An employee who has worked for thirty years for the 
particular employer would be entitled sixty percent of her final average salary; an employee 
whose final average salary was $50,000 per year would be entitled to $30,000 per year in 
pension benefits, not counting retiree healthcare benefits. 
 64.  29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2012) (“The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to 
any employee benefit plan if (1) such plan is a governmental plan.”). Because ERISA’s funding 
requirements do not apply to public pension plans, state and local governments write their 
own rules for pension funding and administration. See, e.g., Natalya Shnitser, Funding 
Discipline for U.S. Public Pension Plans: An Empirical Analysis of Institutional Design, 100 
IOWA L. REV. 663, 668 (2015); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 4 cmt. g (AM. 
LAW INST. 2003) (“Some forms of trusts that are created by statute, especially public 
retirement systems or pension funds . . . are administered as express trusts, the terms of which 
are either set forth in the statute or are supplied by the default rules of general trust law.”). 
 65.  See generally JUN PENG, STATE AND LOCAL PENSION FUND MANAGEMENT 
16–17 (2009). 
 66.  The trustees may be teachers or firefighters or local government administrators. But 
in most cases, they are not investment professionals. See Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV & Amy B. 
Monahan, Who’s Afraid of Good Governance? State Fiscal Crises, Public Pension Underfunding, 
and the Resistance to Governance Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1317, 1326 (2014). 
 67.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 24-4-104 (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess. and First 
Ex. Sess.) (“The administration and control of the Arkansas Public Employees’ Retirement 
System shall be vested in a board called the ‘Board of Trustees . . .’”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-
4921(1), (2) (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (stating that “[t]he fund is a trust fund” and 
that “[t]he board shall have the responsibility for the management of the fund”). 
 68.  For example, the New Mexico Constitution mandates that “[a]ll funds . . . paid 
into . . . a public employees retirement system . . . shall be held . . . in a trust fund to be 
administered and invested by each respective system for the sole and exclusive benefit of the 
members, retirees and other beneficiaries of that system. Expenditures from a system trust fund 
shall only be made for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries and for expenses of administering 
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looked to the Restatement of Trusts to assess whether public pension 
trustees acted in accordance with the “well-established rules of the 
law of trusts.”69 
Although public employees are frequently required to directly 
contribute portions of their salaries into the pension trusts (and 
always do so indirectly by trading lower salaries for pension benefits), 
state statutes effectively regard employees as the trust beneficiaries.70 
 
the system.” N.M. CONST. art. XX, § 22(A). The retirement board is “the trustee[ ] for [its] 
respective system[ ] and ha[s] the sole and exclusive fiduciary duty and responsibility for 
administration and investment of the trust fund held by [its] respective system.” Id. at § 22(B). 
See also CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 17(b) (“The members of the retirement board . . . shall 
discharge their duties with respect to the system solely in the interest of, and for the exclusive 
purposes of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries, minimizing employer 
contributions thereto, and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the system. A 
retirement board’s duty to its participants and their beneficiaries shall take precedence over any 
other duty.”); IDAHO CODE § 59-1301(2) (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. and First Ex. Sess’s) 
(“[T]he fiduciaries of the fund shall discharge their duties with respect to the fund solely in the 
interest of the members and their beneficiaries . . . .”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-4921(1) (LEXIS 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (“The fund is a trust fund and shall be used solely for the exclusive 
purpose of providing benefits to members and member beneficiaries and defraying reasonable 
expenses of administering the fund.”); Fitzpatrick & Monahan, supra note 66, at 1339 
(reporting that in a sample of six state plans, the statutory provisions for each plan require plan 
assets to be held in trust, and also require the plan trustees to act solely in the interest of 
beneficiaries, and with the care, skill, and caution of a prudent person in light of the 
circumstances at the time of the decision). 
 69.  City of Sacramento v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 229 Cal. App. 3d 1470, 1494–95 (Ct. 
App. 1991) (holding that “[u]nder well-established rules of the law of trusts, a trustee’s 
primary duty of loyalty is to the beneficiaries of the trust,” and thus, in interpreting relevant 
definitions, pension fund trustees must subordinate consideration of employer costs to the 
obligation to act solely in the interest of the beneficiaries); see also In re Barney, 710 A.2d 408, 
410 (N.H. 1998) (stating that “[u]nder the common law of trusts, the [board] [of trustees of 
the New Hampshire Retirement System] owe the [NHRS] members and beneficiaries a 
fiduciary obligation to manage the [NHRS] for the benefit of its members and beneficiaries”); 
White v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 268 P.3d 600, 601, 608 (Or. 2011) (relying on a trustee’s 
common law obligation to both “protect capital and secure reasonable return” to hold that 
pension fund trustees “do[] not necessarily breach [their] fiduciary duty” by “administer[ing] 
the system to create and maintain long-term stability and viability in the system,” even if “in so 
doing [they] fail[] to maximize the benefits that will be paid to [current plan beneficiaries]”); 
Arken v. City of Portland, 263 P.3d 975, 1006 (Or. 2011) (finding that trustees do breach 
their fiduciary duties through administrative decisions that favor some beneficiaries over 
others, since the Restatement of Trusts “makes clear that a trustee has a duty of impartiality 
and . . . must administer the trust ‘impartially and with due regard for the diverse beneficial 
interests created by the terms of the trust’”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 
79(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2003)). 
 70.  “[E]mployee contribution rates typically are between four and eight percent of 
pay.” NAT’L ASSN. OF STATE RETIREMENT ADMINS., NASRA ISSUE BRIEF: EMPLOYEE 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PUBLIC PENSION PLANS 1 (2015), 
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Like beneficiaries of traditional donative trusts, the employees cannot 
sell or transfer their interests in the pension trusts.71 Unlike donative 
trust beneficiaries, however, public plan beneficiaries are not directly 
affected by the trustees’ investment management performance. The 
promised pension benefits are generally fixed and subject to legal 
restrictions on some forms of benefit reductions, although there is 
significant variation and legal uncertainty as to the extent of 
the protections.72 
III. PRIOR SCHOLARSHIP 
While scholars have analyzed ERISA’s initial adoption of 
donative trust principles, the pension landscape has changed 
dramatically since 1974. Most importantly, the shortcomings of the 
trust model as adopted in 1974 were limited by the very nature of 
the then prominent but now largely extinct private-sector defined 
benefit plans, which decoupled employee benefits from trustee 
performance. Plan benefits were protected by funding requirements 
and by a federal insurance scheme. Still, the transplanted trust 
regime presented challenges in plan administration decisions and 
decisions regarding the use of plan assets in corporate 
 
http://www.nasra.org/content.asp?contentid=122. “[S]ince 2009, more than 35 states 
(including Puerto Rico) have increased required employee contribution rates.” Id. 
 71.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-4923 (West) (providing that the pension benefits 
“shall not be subject to execution, garnishment or attachment . . . and shall be unassignable.”). 
 72.  The promised pension benefits are generally treated as contractual obligations, and 
some are further protected by constitutional amendments prohibiting the reduction of 
benefits. See Amy Monahan, Understanding the Legal Limits on Public Pension Reform, AM. 
ENTERPRISE INST. 3 (2013), http://www.aei.org/files/2013/05/29/-understanding-the-
legal-limits-on-public-pension-reform_104816268458.pdf (observing that “[s]ome states have 
amended their constitutions to specifically provide that public pension benefits shall be 
considered contractual in nature”). The extent of benefit protection remains subject to 
significant uncertainty and legal challenges. For a summary of recent litigation challenging 
benefit reductions, see Pension Litigation Tracker, 
http://pensionlitigation.org/category/all/topics/reduced-benefits/?submit=View (last visited Dec. 
1, 2015). Furthermore, the scope of protection in municipal bankruptcy likewise remains 
unclear. Scholars such as David Skeel have suggested that public plan participants have pension 
benefit claims that are secured only to the extent of the assets set aside in the pension trusts; 
for any benefit amounts not secured by assets, participants become unsecured creditors of the 
municipality not entitled to priority in any reorganization. See David Skeel, Can Pensions be 
Restructured in (Detroit’s) Municipal Bankruptcy? 11–12 (Oct. 1, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/508. 
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reorganizations.73 In such contexts, employer trustees with discretion 
over the use of plan assets faced strong incentives to use such assets 
to benefit the corporate shareholders rather than the pension 
plan beneficiaries.74 
Scholars such as John Langbein and Daniel Fischel have argued 
that “it was unwise for ERISA to attempt to capture the complex 
responsibilities of plan fiduciaries by analogy to the simpler world of 
the private gratuitous trusts”75 when the latter benefits only the 
donees while the former provides mutual economic advantage.76 
Settlors of donative trusts have no continuing interests in the trusts, 
but employers retain strong economic interests in their retirement 
plans, including the liability for defined benefit plan funding.77 
Accordingly, Langbein and Fischel have called for more forthright 
recognition of the employers’ interests as beneficiaries in the pension 
trusts, arguing that both employers and employees should be 
considered trust beneficiaries and that courts should evaluate 
whether particular trustee decisions are “consistent with the ex ante 
understanding between the parties.”78 Acknowledging that this kind 
of legal analysis would not be simple, the authors have not offered 
any guidance on how courts should determine whether a particular 
action is consistent with the ex ante understanding among the 
parties. The lack of concrete guidance for the task reflects the 
inherent tension in the undertaking: while donative trust law has 
always required trustees to be impartial with respect to the interests 
of different beneficiaries, requiring a trustee to adjudicate between 
the interests of the employer-beneficiaries and employee-beneficiaries 
would frustrate the very concept of a fiduciary. 
Similarly, although scholars have recognized that pension trusts 
are “self-settled” insofar as they are “created in consideration of 
services rendered by the employees, and that the employees are 
 
 73.  See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2, at 1138–43, 1155–57; see also Stein, supra 
note 51 at 54–55. 
 74.  Id.; see also Langbein, supra note 51, at 132. 
 75.  Id. at 1157. 
 76.  Id. at 1113–14, 1117–18; see also John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks 
Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207 (Gerhard Casper et al. eds., 1991) (observing that “there are 
important differences between the private trust and the pension trust, and ERISA is sometimes 
insensitive to these differences”). 
 77.  Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2, at 1112–13. 
 78.  Id. at 1158–59. 
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therefore the settlors,”79 the acknowledgment has been purely 
theoretical.80 After all, if the law recognized employees not just as 
beneficiaries of the pension trust but also as its settlors, then, under 
trust law principles, the employees would have to be afforded the 
corresponding control rights, including control over the selection of 
the trustees. But a trust in which the employers and employees were 
both to be properly recognized as “settlor-beneficiaries” would be 
unworkable.81 The donative trust assumes the existence of clearly 
defined settlor preferences and provides a mechanism for imposing 
such preferences on a trustee, and ultimately on the beneficiaries. 
The donative trust model does not provide a mechanism for the 
coordination of the preferences of multiple settlors, particularly 
where such settlors are also the trust beneficiaries. 
The current regulatory framework for private and public plans 
therefore continues to rely on the fiction that treats employers as the 
trust settlors and trustees, and employees as the trust beneficiaries. 
Pursuant to this fiction, the current system relies on traditional 
donative trust fiduciary obligations to protect locked-in employees, 
all while saddling them with the investment risk.82 Indeed, the 
regulatory landscape for defined contribution plans now resembles 
that of welfare benefit plans prior to the passage of the Affordable 
 
 79.  1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS § 156.3 (4th ed. 1987). 
 80.  See e.g., Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy 
of the ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. REV. 459, 517 (2015) (noting that a 
rule in which the fiduciary had to consider and balance the competing interests of employers 
and employees “would be difficult to fashion and difficult for both fiduciaries and courts 
to apply”). 
 81.  Business trusts, however, have recognized a version of “settlor-beneficiaries” in the 
form of “investors,” who voluntarily acquire their interests in the trusts and who may also exit 
from trust arrangements if they are displeased with the trustee. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit.12, § 3805 (West 2016) (“A beneficial owner’s beneficial interest in the statutory trust is 
freely transferable except to the extent otherwise provided in the governing instrument of the 
statutory trust.”). Recent analysis of mutual funds—most of which are organized as business 
trusts—has shown that when investors can exit easily from the trusts, the exit strategy 
eliminates the investors’ incentives to enforce fiduciary obligations. John Morley & Quinn 
Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual 
Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 102 (2010). 
 82.  In contrast, under the default provisions of the statutory business trust statutes, 
beneficiary interests in statutory business trusts are generally freely transferable and holders of 
beneficial interests generally have certain control rights, including the right to direct the 
trustees with respect to certain events. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 12, §§ 3805–06 (West 
2016) (stating that a “beneficial interest in the statutory trust is freely transferable” and giving 
persons the right “to direct the trustees . . . in the management of the statutory trust”). 
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Care Act. In the absence of substantive regulation and in the 
presence of employer incentives to minimize healthcare expenses, the 
discretion and deference afforded by ERISA’s trust-based framework 
to conflicted employer fiduciaries became, perversely, “a shield 
against liability.”83 
Recent scholarship on retirement savings identifies the numerous 
shortcomings of the current private and public pension 
arrangements, including the poor performance of employer 
fiduciaries,84 but rarely directly questions the persistence of the 
donative trust paradigm across private and public plans.85 A number 
of authors continue to advocate for greater reliance on the fiduciary 
standard.86 However, in what might be considered an implicit 
 
 83.  See, e.g., Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer’s Shield: The Perversity of 
ERISA Fiduciary Law, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391 (2000) (examining the “perverse 
operation of ERISA’s fiduciary regime” in the “administration of modern health care and 
pension benefit plans”); see also Langbein, supra note 76, at 216; Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. 
Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 433, 472–73 (2010); Beverly Cohen, 
Divided Loyalties: How the Metlife v. Glenn Standard Discounts ERISA Fiduciaries’ Conflicts of 
Interest, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 955, 974 (2009).  
 84.  On private-sector pension plans, see generally Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose 
Unwisely: Congress’ Misguided Decision to Leave 401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 
11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 361 (2002) and Zelinsky, supra note 52. On public-sector 
plans, see generally David Hess, Protecting and Politicizing Public Pension Fund Assets: 
Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Governance Structures and Practices, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 187 (2005) and Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 3 (2013). 
 85.  But see Dana M. Muir, Choice Architecture and the Locus of Fiduciary Obligation in 
Defined Contribution Plans, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2013) (criticizing the employer-centric trust 
model used in 401(k) plan regulation and advocating for the shifting for fiduciary 
responsibility onto financial service providers); Michael J. Collins, It’s Common, But Is It 
Right? The Common Law of Trusts in ERISA Fiduciary Litigation, 16 LAB. LAW. 391 (2001) 
(analyzing and criticizing the following specific “situations in which courts have utilized the 
common law of trusts in developing a federal common law of ERISA: (i) a fiduciary duty to 
disclose early retirement windows that are under ‘serious consideration’ by management; (ii) a 
right to contribution from a breaching co-fiduciary; (iii) nonfiduciary liability; and (iv) a 
requirement that an employee stock ownership plan diversify its investments beyond 
employer stock”). 
 86.  See, e.g., Emily Adams, Protecting America’s Financial Future: Why Courts Should 
Enforce ERISA’s Duties of Prudence and Disclosure, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 345, 358 
(2011) (arguing for stricter court enforcement and “enhanced” fiduciary obligations); Anne 
Tucker, Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined Contribution Society, 51 
HOUS. L. REV. 153, 215 (2013) (proposing “strengthening fiduciary duties for structural plan 
decisions”); Dana M. Muir, Reflections on ERISA’s Fiduciary Provisions: An Integral and 
Integrated Part of the Statute, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 539, 552 (2013) (arguing that “ERISA’s 
success in significant measure rests on its fiduciary provisions, which are integral to keeping 
fiduciaries focused on the basics: loyalty and prudence”). 
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acknowledgement of the model’s failure, recent academic proposals 
put forth a variety of regulations to restrict the authority of 
employers and mandate certain investment options for 
employee participants.87 
This Article considers a more fundamental shift. The next 
Section sets the foundation for the proposed reforms by showing 
why the donative trust framework has proven inadequate for both 
private-sector defined contribution plans and public-sector defined 
benefit plans. 
IV. LIMITATIONS OF TRUST-BASED GOVERNANCE 
The current regulatory regime for retirement savings centers on 
the employee-employer relationship. The central role of the 
employer in individual retirement savings, however, is a historical 
artifact that reflects an era in which employers used pension and 
healthcare benefits to avoid wage caps, to encourage bonding to the 
firm during the employee’s most productive years, and to facilitate 
timely employee departure after a certain age.88 Early pension 
arrangements often did not require employees to directly contribute 
anything to the pension fund and employers bore the entire 
investment responsibility and risk. Although the pension benefits 
were still a form of employee compensation, given the greater 
employer control and the lack of direct employee contributions or 
involvement, such arrangements had something of a gift-like quality, 
which facilitated ERISA’s (and public plan) reliance on donative 
trust fiduciary principles to regulate pension plans. The legacy of the 
gift analogy is discussed below. 
 
 87.  See, e.g., James Kwak, Improving Retirement Savings Options for Employees, 15 U. 
PA. J. BUS. L. 483, 511 (2013); Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The 
Pervasive Problem of Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 
1476, 1501 (2015). 
 88.  Douglas A. Wolf & Frank Levy, Pension Coverage, Pension Vesting, and the 
Distribution of Job Tenures, in RETIREMENT AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 23, 27 (Brookings 
Institution) (Henry J. Aaron & Gary Burtless eds., 1984) (“[An] employee’s productivity 
begins to decline at some point in his career, but because of the customs of the internal labor 
market, a firm cannot reduce a long-term employee’s wages. For this reason, a firm has an 
interest in encouraging employees to retire at certain ages. The retirement income provided by 
a pension facilitates such induced retirement.”). 
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A. Private-Sector Plans 
This Section considers the shortcomings of the private-sector 
401(k) plans that stem from the reliance on the donative trust 
framework as a primary regulatory tool.89 Today, employees are at 
the mercy of employer “settlors” to establish a plan in the first place, 
leaving more than forty percent of private-sector employees without 
access to an employer-sponsored retirement plan.90 Those with access 
to an employer plan and who choose to make salary deferrals to save 
for retirement remain subject to employer control over plan design 
and administration. In the absence of market checks, to protect 
locked-in employees, the current framework imposes fiduciary 
obligations on employers that administer such plans. Such 
obligations are not consistent with the employers’ economic interests 
and are not readily enforceable by the employees or relevant 
regulatory agencies. Empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that 
as a result of having the employers as mandatory investment 
intermediaries, employees are frequently subjected to poorly 
constructed investment menus and non-transparent fee structures. 
1. Employers as both settlors and fiduciaries 
According to the Department of Labor, the decision to offer a 
retirement plan can be “one of the most challenging, yet rewarding” 
decisions that an employer can make.91 No employer is required to 
establish a retirement plan. Many do not. The ability of employers to 
simply cease offering retirement plans at any time animates the 
current regulatory framework.92 
 
 89.  Although ERISA does impose a disclosure and reporting regime on 401(k) plans, 
as well as certain non-discrimination, anti-alienation and vesting rules, the administration of 
401(k) plans is regulated primarily by the imposition of trust-based fiduciary obligations on 
those who administer such plans. The application of such obligations in practice has generated 
much confusion. See, e.g., Advisory Council on Emp. Welfare & Pension Benefit Plans, 
Outsourcing Employee Benefit Plan Services, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/2014ACreport3.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2016). 
 90.  BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES – 
MARCH 2014 (2014). 
 91.  Meeting Your Fiduciary Responsibilities, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/fiduciaryresponsibility.html (last visited 
Apr. 23, 2016). 
 92.  See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Employer-Based Retirement Income—the Ideal, the 
Possible, and the Reality, 11 ELDER L.J. 37, 44 (2003) (observing that because private pensions 
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The decision to offer a retirement plan is itself purely a business 
or “settlor” decision that is not governed by ERISA’s fiduciary 
standards. Similarly, decisions to determine the benefit package, to 
include certain features in a plan, to amend a plan, and to terminate 
a plan—in effect, the infinite number of choices that shape a plan’s 
design—are also business decisions in which an employer may act on 
behalf of the business and presumably in the best interest of 
the shareholders.93 
Once the plan is established, however, the employer, like a 
trustee in a donative trust, must take on fiduciary responsibilities 
with respect to the plan. With the exception of the so-called 
“business” decisions enumerated above, employers who have 
discretion over the plan or plan assets must exercise their discretion 
solely in the interest of plan participants and for the exclusive purpose 
of providing benefits and defraying reasonable expenses. They must 
carry out their duties prudently and in accordance with the 
plan documents.94 
In practice, the fiduciary duty of 401(k) plan sponsors (i.e., the 
employers) extends primarily to (1) the day-to-day administration of 
the plan, including the establishment of a trust to hold plan assets, a 
recordkeeping system to track the flow of monies going to and from 
the retirement plan, and a reporting system to provide adequate 
disclosure to participants and to the government; and (2) the 
selection and monitoring of an investment menu from which 
individual participants select their investments.95 In each case, 
although a plan sponsor may hire third-party service providers with 
relevant expertise to assist with the enumerated tasks, the selection 
 
are voluntary arrangements, “[t]he greater the pressure put on employers to provide more 
widespread benefits, the less likely it is they will maintain pension plans at all”). 
 93.  See, e.g., Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996) (“Plan sponsors who 
alter the terms of a plan do not fall into the category of fiduciaries . . . . When employers 
undertake those actions, they do not act as fiduciaries . . . but are analogous to the settlors 
of a trust.”). 
 94.  29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a) (2012). 
 95.  ERISA Section 404(c) allows employers to delegate individual investment decisions 
to employees. The employer is then relieved of fiduciary responsibility for the employees’ 
selections if the investment menu provides the employees with a range of diversified investment 
options, with enough information about the alternatives to enable employees to make 
informed investment decisions, and with the right to change their investment selections with 
reasonable frequency. 26 I.R.C. § 404(c) (2012); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(c) (2012). 
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and oversight of such providers is itself a fiduciary task that remains 
with the employer.96 
Employer decisions regarding the investment menu and the 
selection of third-party service providers have a significant impact on 
the long-term savings of individual plan participants. The impact 
comes primarily in the form of plan costs and the extent to which an 
employer is prudent in ensuring that the costs charged to the 
employees are reasonable relative to the services provided. Fees and 
expenses paid by employees substantially reduce the growth in 
employee retirement accounts. As the Department of Labor has 
warned, over thirty-five years, a “1 percent difference in fees and 
expenses [reduces an] account balance at retirement by 
28 percent.”97 
 
 96.  See, e.g., Dana M. Muir, Revenue Sharing in 401(k) Plans: Employers as Monitors?, 
20 CONN. INS. L.J. 485, 504 (2014) (“ERISA’s exclusion of mutual funds from fiduciary 
status and de facto exclusion of nearly any service provider that wants to be excluded leaves 
employers holding the fiduciary bag for 401(k) plans.”). In recent years, multiple employer 
plans (MEPs), including so-called “open MEPs,” have gained some traction among small and 
mid-sized employers. MEPs generally purport to take on plan administration for participating 
employers, thus reducing employers’ fiduciary liability. See, e.g., Dan Toomey, Is a Multiple 
Employer Plan the Right Retirement Option for Your Business?, TRINET (May 2012), 
http://www.trinet.com/newsletter/05_12/multiple_employer_plan.htm. Although the 
Department of Labor has expressed concern over such arrangements particularly with respect 
to the “open” MEPs that bring together unrelated employers, there appears to be growing 
momentum to resolve the current limitations of the open MEP arrangements. See Hazel 
Bradford, Multiple employer plans grabbing more attention, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Mar. 
17, 2014) (noting that Phyllis Borzi, Assistant Secretary of Labor of the Employee Benefits 
Security Administration, has suggested that promoters of open MEPs are “falsely claiming the 
employers will have no ERISA reporting or fiduciary obligations if they sign up for an open 
MEP”); Sean Forbes, Support for Open MEPs Builds at Senate Panel Hearing, PENSION & 
BENEFITS DAILY (Oct. 28, 2015). In 2015, the Department of Labor even expressed its 
support for the creation of state-sponsored multiple employer plans. See Employee Benefits 
Security Administration, Interpretive Bulletin Relating to State Savings Programs that Sponsor 
or Facilitate Plans Covered by ERISA, 80 Fed. Reg. 71936 (2015), 
http://webapps.dol.gov/federalregister/PdfDisplay.aspx?DocId=28540. At the same time, 
certain service providers have begun to encourage plan sponsors to name an external 
investment manager directly in the plan documents in order to transform such act from a 
fiduciary one to a “non-fiduciary settlor act.” See, e.g., Heath Miller & Al Otto, Conflicts Bring 
Liability to Retirement Plan Fiduciaries: The Ethics of Serving Two Masters, AM. CONF. INST. 
(May 2014), http://www.americanconference.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/2014-ICLE-Article.pdf. The merits of this legal theory have not 
been tested and the strategy, while likely to foster the entrenchment of particular service 
providers, would not absolve plan sponsors from ongoing monitoring obligations. 
 97.  A Look At 401(k) Plan Fees, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/401k_employee.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2016). 
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What sorts of costs must the employer negotiate and monitor for 
its employees? The largest component of 401(k) plan fees and 
expenses is associated with managing plan investments. Fees for 
investment management and other investment-related services are 
generally assessed as a percentage of assets invested by particular 
employees and are ultimately deducted from the investment returns. 
A particular investment fund may, for example, charge individual 
participants 75 basis points as an investment management fee. In 
addition, there are the administrative costs of setting up and 
operating the plans, including the provision of recordkeeping, 
accounting, legal, and trustee services. 
At present, there are a myriad of fees and fee arrangements that 
service providers and employers use to cover the various costs of 
providing a 401(k) plan to employees.98 For example: 
• The employer may choose to cover some or all of the 
administrative expenses of the retirement plan using its 
corporate assets. Such a decision is not a fiduciary decision 
and the expenses covered by the employer are not subject to 
any kind of “reasonableness” test under ERISA; or 
• The employer may pass both the administrative and the 
investment costs onto the plan. In this case, the administrative 
costs may be shared equally by all participants or allocated in 
proportion to the value of assets in individual accounts; or 
• The employer may negotiate a revenue sharing arrangement 
whereby service providers offer to apply some of the revenue 
from certain investment management fees toward the costs of 
plan administration; in such cases, either the employer’s “out 
of pocket” bill may decrease, or a smaller administrative 
expense may be charged to the plan. Importantly, because 
only certain investment options (for example, certain actively 
managed funds) may offer the revenue sharing feature, the 
fees collected from individuals who select such investment 
 
 98.  Plan sponsors currently have to navigate the revenue sharing fees, sub-TA fees, 
shareholder servicing fees, 12b1 fees, finder’s fees, wrap fees, mortality fees, and market 
adjustment fees. See Matthew D. Hutcheson, Uncovering and Understanding Hidden Fees in 
Qualified Retirement Plans, 15 ELDER L.J. 323, 339 (2007); see also Deloitte Consulting LLP, 
Inside the Structure of Defined Contribution/401(k) Plan Fees, 2013: A study assessing the 
mechanics of the ‘all-in’ fee 6 (Aug. 2014) (noting that “[t]here are a variety of fee 
arrangements to pay for the wide array of services used by defined contribution plans,” all of 
which can be combined together in a variety of different ways based on the needs of the 
plan sponsor). 
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options may subsidize the administrative expenses for the plan 
as a whole.99 
In each case, the employer meanders between settlor and trustee 
roles,100 all while serving as a critical intermediary between individual 
employees and the capital markets. The next sections present the 
empirical evidence of poor employer performance in this 
intermediary capacity, as well as the reasons why such empirical 
findings should not be surprising. 
2. Assessing fiduciary performance 
The decisions of private-sector employers with respect to plan 
administration, though subject to the fiduciary standard, have 
frequently left employees with investment options and fee 
arrangements that are suboptimal relative to what is available in the 
marketplace.101 Despite extensive empirical evidence documenting 
the desirability of low-cost index funds, employer-constructed 
401(k) menus have continued to add relatively expensive actively 
managed funds,102 including those whose above-average expenses 
could not be justified by the added diversification.103 According to a 
recent study, in the average 401(k) plan, “an investor making 
optimal menu allocations [has been] forced to pay forty-three basis 
 
 99.  Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1961, 1983 (2010). As Fisch recounts, the issue is whether companies managing the 
plans are receiving payments in return for including certain fund companies in their plans. 
Such payments might encourage employers to include inferior funds in their investment menus 
and to reject strong performers that do not participate in revenue sharing. Id. 
 100.  See infra Section IV.A.3. 
 101.  Ayres & Curtis, supra note 87, at 1501 (concluding that the study’s empirical 
findings show that “high fees are a significant issue for participants in 401(k) plans”). For an 
overview of the nearly forty cases related to 401(k) fees that had been commenced as of 
September 2015, see 401(k) Fee Cases, Chartered, GROOM L. GROUP, (Sep. 30, 2015), 
http://www.groom.com/media/publication/1636_401k_Fee_Cases%20_Detailed_Chart_Se
ptember%20_2015.pdf. 
 102.  See Kwak, supra note 87, at 511; see also Jeffrey R. Brown, Nellie Liang, & Scott 
Weisbenner, Individual Account Investment Options and Portfolio Choice: Behavioral Lessons 
from 401(k) Plans, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 1992, 1992-2013 (2007) (finding that “the vast majority 
of the new funds added to 401(k) plans are high-cost actively managed equity funds, as 
opposed to lower-cost equity index funds.”). 
 103.  Ayres & Curtis, supra note 87, at 1504–07 (discussing the problem of so-called 
“dominated funds,” which the authors describe as “funds that are so clearly inferior to other 
funds or groups of funds offered in the same plan menu that investors are clearly better off 
avoiding them” and finding that in a sample of 3,534 plans, 52% had at least one dominated 
fund on the menu). 
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points in expenses over [a low-cost] benchmark,” with “19% of plans 
hav[ing] menu additional fund fees of more than seventy-five basis 
points.”104 In some cases, the additional fees from poorly constructed 
plan menus have eliminated the preferential tax treatment afforded 
to 401(k) plans.105 Although poorly constructed menus have been 
found across all types of employers, losses from additional fees have 
been particularly high for employees in smaller plans, which have had 
both higher costs and lower quality menus.106 
The high fees in 401(k) plans reflect two underlying weaknesses 
of employer-fiduciaries. First, despite their obligation to act 
prudently—that is “with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under 
the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of 
an enterprise of a like character and with like aims”107—employer 
fiduciaries have demonstrated profound gaps in their understanding 
of retirement plan arrangements. The Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) has documented employers’ struggle to understand 
the fees that they and their participants are charged, as well as their 
tendency to underestimate the fees to which their employees are 
subject.108 For example, approximately half of the employers surveyed 
by the GAO in 2011 “did not know if they or their participants paid 
investment management fees” or whether their plans incurred 
transaction costs, while a third did not know whether or not the plan 
paid for trustee, legal, or audit services.109 Scholars have observed 
that it has been seemingly “impossible to require employers to take 
more of an interest in their employees’ retirement savings options”110 
 
 104.  Id. at 1501. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. (finding that “the problem of fees is especially acute in small plans”); see also 
Deloitte Consulting LLP, supra note 98, at 4 (finding plan size to be a significant fee driver). 
 107.  29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 108.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-325, 401(K) PLANS: 
INCREASED EDUCATIONAL OUTREACH AND BROADER OVERSIGHT MAY HELP REDUCE PLAN 
FEES (2012) (citing various consultants’ observations regarding common employer 
misunderstanding and finding, for example, “that at least 45 of the 91 plan sponsors 
[surveyed] had revenue sharing arrangements, despite reporting not having or not knowing of 
such arrangements”). 
 109.  Id. Lack of relevant knowledge was more prevalent among small employers (those 
with fewer than 50 employees). Id. at 17–18. 
 110.  Kwak, supra note 87, at 511; see also Brown et al., supra note 102. 
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and that “few employers regularly audit their plans to lower costs.”111 
Phyllis Borzi, the Assistant Secretary of Labor of the Employee 
Benefits Security Administration, observed that as of 2013, many 
plan sponsors did not understand the pricing structure for bundled 
services and mistakenly thought that “services like recordkeeping 
were being provided free of charge.”112 The Department of Labor 
has since promulgated fee-disclosure regulations to help both plan 
fiduciaries and plan participants make better-informed decisions.113 
Though the effectiveness of these disclosure requirements remains to 
be determined, the need for such an intervention underscores the 
limitations of fiduciary-based governance in the current 
pension landscape.114 
The regulatory efforts also reflect the challenges facing employer 
fiduciaries in navigating relationships with—and payments to—third-
party service providers, some of whom provide both plan-related and 
non-plan-related corporate services to the plan sponsors.115 As recent 
litigation has revealed, such service providers may discount non-plan 
 
 111.  John Wasik, Why 401(k)s Have Failed, FORBES (Apr. 24, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2013/04/24/why-401ks-have-
failed/#199dc50d4a7e. 
 112.  Christopher Carosa, Exclusive Interview with Phyllis C. Borzi: Why Plan Sponsors 
Shouldn’t Treat Their 401k Plans Like Cheap T-Shirts, FIDUCIARYNEWS.COM (Sept. 24, 2013, 
12:03 AM), http://www.fiduciarynews.com/2013/09/exclusive-interview-with-phyllis-c-
borzi-why-plan-sponsors-shouldnt-treat-their-401k-plans-like-cheap-t-shirts/. 
 113. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2(c)(iv) (establishing specific disclosures that plan 
service providers must provide to plan fiduciaries to help ensure that the fiduciaries are 
provided the information they need to assess both the reasonableness of the compensation to 
be paid for plan services and potential conflicts of interest that may affect the performance of 
those services); Fiduciary Requirements for Disclosure in Participant-Directed Individual 
Account Plans, 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a–5(c)–(d) (requiring plan administrators to provide 
participants with certain “plan-related” and “investment-related” information). 
 114.  The regulations—and employer fiduciaries—face an uphill battle since “service 
providers are going to considerable lengths to make the mandated fee disclosures difficult for 
employers to comprehend and analyze.” See Dana M. Muir, Revenue Sharing in 401(k) Plans: 
Employers as Monitors?, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 485, 509 (2014). 
 115.  See, e.g., Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 327, 337–41 (8th Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 477 (2014) (finding an ERISA violation in the plan sponsor’s failure to evaluate the 
reasonableness of fees charged by its recordkeeper); Kruger v. Novant Health, Inc., No. 
1:14CV208, 2015 WL 5511052 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 2015) (denying a motion to dismiss 
plaintiffs’ claims that the plan sponsor violated its fiduciary obligations by failing to monitor 
the compensation, including the increase in fees, paid to the plan recordkeeper); Complaint, 
Troudt v. Oracle Corp., D. Colo., No. 1:16-cv-00175 (Jan. 22, 2016) (alleging that Oracle 
breached its ERISA fiduciary duties by paying excessive fees for record-keeping and 
administrative services and resulting in more than $40 million of losses to the plan).  
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services provided to plan sponsors while charging above-market rates 
for the plan services.116 Alternatively, investment fund providers have 
commonly offered to “share” or channel a portion of the investment 
management fees from certain funds toward the cost of various 
administrative services provided for 401(k) plans, thereby lowering 
employers’ out-of-pocket costs.117 Recent scholarship has also shown 
that employers have not successfully resisted the tendency of mutual 
fund companies serving as plan trustees to include their own 
affiliated funds in the investment menus, even when such funds have 
performed poorly.118 
3. The shortcomings of ERISA’s fiduciary standard 
ERISA’s fiduciary standard, though arguably an afterthought in 
the original 1974 legislation, has become the centerpiece of 401(k) 
plan governance. Yet while ERISA’s drafters understood that a 
fiduciary standard borrowed from trust law and superimposed on 
private employers could not substitute for substantive pension 
regulation, current pension regulation aims to protect U.S. 
employees primarily by subjecting those who administer private 
pension plans to trust law’s care and loyalty obligations. 
This Section shows that while the fiduciary regime may be an 
efficient governance mechanism for a traditional donative trust, it is 
ill suited for the non-donative, dual-settlor, dual-beneficiary 
arrangement that is the modern 401(k) plan. The trust-based 
fiduciary standard for plan administration is generally inconsistent 
with employers’ economic interests and “settlor” rights and, in the 
absence of rules-based guidance, creates costly uncertainty for plan 
sponsors. Furthermore, because both employee rights and judicial 
review of plan administration draw on trust-law principles, 
employees have limited access to either judicial or market remedies 
for plan mismanagement. 
 a. Employer conflict, confusion, and costs. First and foremost, the 
current fiduciary regime perpetuates ERISA’s long-standing fiction 
 
 116.  Tussey, 746 F.3d 327 (finding that the employer defendants knew that removing a 
particular Wellington Fund and mapping its assets to the Fidelity Freedom Funds would 
ultimately benefit ABB). 
 117.  See Muir, supra note 114, at 487–95 (2014). 
 118.  Veronika K. Pool, Clemens Sialm, & Irina Stefanescu, It Pays to Set the Menu: 
Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans, J. FIN. 1 (Dec. 2015). 
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about the employer’s ability to successfully wear and switch between 
two “hats”—one for its role as settlor, which permits the employer 
to consider its own interests in establishing and designing a plan, and 
another for its role as plan fiduciary, which requires the employer to 
act solely in the interest of plan participants in the course of plan 
administration.119 The second hat requires employers—who are 
otherwise conditioned to further the interests of shareholders—to act 
solely in the interest of employees when dealing with what is, in 
effect, a form of employee compensation. But employers do not 
conceive of themselves as fiduciaries of the employees when 
negotiating and managing other forms of employee compensation, 
and indeed are typically in a kind of adversarial position with respect 
to the employees.120 
Although ERISA does not require employers to wear the 
fiduciary hat when determining the generosity of the plan terms, the 
problem is that the line between settlor and fiduciary decisions has 
never been, and indeed, can never be, clear.121 Many administrative 
“settlor” decisions, in practice, have the same effect as “fiduciary” 
implementation decisions. For example, employers can freely choose 
to offer less generous contributions or not to pay for certain 
administrative costs of the plan (settlor decisions), yet they may not 
take employer costs into consideration when selecting service 
providers or investment options (fiduciary decisions). It is not 
surprising that a sample of recent settlements reflects employers’ 
unwillingness to heed this artificial distinction.122 
 
 119.  At its inception, the drafters of ERISA were cognizant of the fact that employers 
liable for the funding of defined benefit plans would demand control over such plans. 
Accordingly, ERISA permitted employers to have their own officers, employees, or agents 
serve as trustees and manage the administration of the plan and the investment of plan assets. 
See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2, at 1126–27. The courts subsequently held that 
nonneutral trustees must make their decisions “with an eye single to the interests of the 
participants and beneficiaries,” but would not be found at fault if particular decisions 
“incidentally” benefitted the corporation. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 
(2d Cir. 1982). 
 120.  See, e.g., Maher, supra note 60, at 43 (noting that in negotiating the terms of 
employee benefits such as pensions, “the employer is presumptively the 
employee’s adversary”). 
 121.  For a discussion of the limitations of the Supreme Court’s settlor/fiduciary 
doctrine, see Muir & Stein, supra note 80, at 514–36. 
 122.  Robert Steyer, Recent Fiduciary Breach Settlements, PENSIONS & INVS. (Feb. 23, 
2015), http://www.pionline.com/article/20150223/PRINT/302239972/recent-fiduciary-
breach-settlements (describing various “revenue sharing” arrangements in which fees for 
certain investments were used to offset employer costs); see also Amy B. Monahan, Employers as 
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Among the employers who recognize the obligation to wear the 
fiduciary hat in administering the plan, many struggle to understand 
precisely what the fiduciary hat requires. Fiduciary obligations do 
not set clear rules and requirements for plan administration or 
investment menu selection, but instead operate on the basis of 
vigorously litigated loyalty and prudence standards. Current 
litigation reveals a striking lack of consensus about what the fiduciary 
standard requires of plan fiduciaries.123 
Consequently, retirement experts observe that “plan sponsors 
just aren’t aware of the nature of their responsibilities as plan 
sponsors” and many “don’t recognize the true nature of their 
personal fiduciary liability.”124 Even scholars and practitioners who 
embrace the current fiduciary framework seek to simplify the 
fiduciary standard by replacing it with a list of permissible 
investments that limit the employer’s fiduciary discretion.125 At the 
same time, a whole industry has emerged to find ways of helping 
employers skirt the fiduciary label and limit participants’ ability to 
bring suit, thereby frustrating the very purpose of the 
federal legislation.126 
 
Risks, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 773 (2014) (“An employer may select a 401(k) plan 
administrator, and 401(k) plan investment options based on which company will provide them 
with the lowest out-of-pocket costs, not which will deliver the most retirement security 
to participants.”). 
 123.  See, e.g., Jacklyn Wille, Justices Wrangle With Monitoring Duties of 401(k) 
Fiduciaries During Oral Arguments, PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (Feb. 25, 2015), 
http://news.bna.com/pdln/display/batch_print_display.adp?searchid=26395545 (noting the 
lack of consensus among Supreme Court justices in determining what 401(k) fiduciaries 
monitoring plan investments must do to satisfy their fiduciary obligations); see also Advisory 
Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans, supra note 89 (calling on the 
Department of Labor to clarify fiduciary obligations in outsourcing administrative tasks). 
 124.  Carosa, supra note 112. 
 125.  Kwak, for example, suggests that the Section 404(c) fiduciary safe harbor should be 
limited to plans that only include low-cost index funds. Kwak, supra note 87, at 530. 
 126.  See, e.g., John J. Cannon III & Kenneth J. Laverriere, Just Say No: Why Directors 
Should Avoid Duties That Will Subject Them to ERISA, PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (Feb. 25, 
2015), http://news.bna.com/pdln/display/batch_print_display.adp?searchid=26395549 
(noting that “ERISA imposes standards of conduct on fiduciaries that are more restrictive than 
those imposed on directors generally, and complying with these standards can lead to potential 
conflicts with a director’s overall responsibility to the corporation and its shareholders.”); 
Heath Miller & Al Otto, Conflicts Bring Liability to Retirement Plan Fiduciaries: The Ethics of 
Serving Two Masters, AM. CONF. INST. (May 2014), 
http://www.americanconference.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/2014-ICLE-
Article.pdf (discussing the strategy of designating investment managers directly in the plan 
document as a means of limiting the liability of the plan sponsor); Defined Contribution 
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The search for ways to escape the fiduciary label reflects the fact 
that fiduciary decision-making is not costless for employers, who, by 
deciding to offer a 401(k) plan, accept the risk of fiduciary liability 
for any actions taken in a fiduciary capacity. The time and effort 
necessary to understand the 401(k) landscape; to find, evaluate, and 
monitor service providers; and to construct investment menus that 
will pass fiduciary muster is not trivial for the many employers who 
are not in the business of investment management and whose staffs 
have no special skills or preparation for the task.127 
The benefits of employee retention and satisfaction, however, are 
more likely to correlate with the generosity of the “settlor” (non-
fiduciary) decisions like employer matches, than with the degree of 
menu or fee optimization.128 The latter is relatively difficult to assess 
and of varying consequence to different employees. To the extent 
that an employer offers in its 401(k) menu both “good” and “bad” 
 
Outsourcing with Russell, RUSSELL INVESTMENTS, http://www.russell.com/us/institutional-
investors/solutions/defined-contribution-outsourcing.page (last visited Apr. 23, 2016); see 
also Christopher Carosa, Exclusive Interview: ERISA Attorney Stephen Rosenberg Says 
Litigation’s Legacy is Improved Plan Design, FIDUCIARYNEWS.COM (Oct. 20, 2015), 
http://www.fiduciarynews.com/2015/10/exclusive-interview-erisa-attorney-stephen-
rosenberg-says-litigations-legacy-is-improved-plan-design/ (observing that, in response to the 
recent uptick in 401k litigation, plan sponsors have sought to design and draft retirement plans 
in ways that “limit, either substantively or tactically, the ability of participants or beneficiaries 
to successfully bring suit . . . .”). 
 127.  See Nevin Adams, Biggest Small Plan Barrier? Burdensome Administration, ASPPA 
NET (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.asppa.org/News/Browse-
Topics/Details/ArticleID/4232/Biggest-Small-Plan-Barrier-Burdensome-Administration 
(reporting that burdensome plan administration was the largest obstacle to smaller employers 
offering a workplace retirement plan); Comment Letter from Norman Stein, Senior Policy 
Advisor, Pension Rights Center (Jan 19. 2016), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-AB71-
00065.pdf (observing that “many small employers lack expertise to identify plan providers 
whose products comply with ERISA prudence without engaging expensive independent 
advisors, and many such employers may thus have concerns about potential liability when they 
act without such expertise.”). 
 128.  See, e.g., Amy B. Monahan, An Affordable Care Act for Retirement Plans? 20 
CONN. INS. L.J. 459, 465 (2014) (noting that “most employees, when deciding whether or 
not to accept or retain an offer of employment from a firm, probably do not examine plan 
details such as plan defaults, the quality of plan investments, investment fees, or forms of 
distribution”). Furthermore, the adequacy of employees’ retirement plan savings is seldom of 
concern to employers. See Majority of U.S. Companies Do Not Measure Effectiveness of 
Retirement Plans for Employees, Wells Fargo Survey Reveals, WELLS FARGO (Apr. 19, 2012), 
https://www.wellsfargo.com/about/press/2012/20120419_MajorityofUSCompanies/ 
(finding that as of 2011, only 11% of plan sponsors were “measuring each employee’s 
retirement income and comparing it to expected needs; the majority (51%) [did] not provide 
employees with estimates of annual retirement income they [could] expect based on 
plan balances”). 
05.SHNITSER.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/4/2016  6:38 PM 
629 Trusts No More 
 665 
options, the employees who select the “good” options are no worse 
off for having certain “bad” options in the menu (indeed, they may 
actually be better off if the revenue sharing fees from the “bad” 
options are used to cover the administrative expenses of the plan as a 
whole). Thus, despite the obligations imposed by ERISA’s 
“fiduciary” hat, employers face significant hurdles in meeting those 
obligations. Enforcement of such employer obligations is limited by 
the features of the trust-based judicial review discussed below.  
 b. Trust-based judicial review. The 2015 Supreme Court opinion 
in Tibble v. Edison follows a long line of cases that invoke the 
donative trust analogy in determining the scope of ERISA fiduciary 
obligations and the appropriate standard of judicial review.129 In 
applying the analogy, however, the courts have wrestled with the 
reality that employers who believe that the costs of 401(k) plans 
outweigh their benefits may terminate existing plans or refuse to 
form new ones.130 In other words, the limits of fiduciary obligation in 
the context of retirement plans have been set, at least in part, by 
employer threats to stop offering plans to their employees.131 The fear 
of discouraging plan formation has resulted in the application of the 
trust analogy that places a great premium on the employers’ role as 
trust settlors, while ignoring the employees’ settlor role and the 
employers’ beneficiary interests. Employers, like donative trust 
settlors, have been afforded great deference in setting the scope of 
“trustee” authority to administer the trust and interpret its terms.132 
 
 129.  Tibble v. Edison Int’l., 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828 (2015) (stating that the court has 
“often noted that an ERISA fiduciary’s duty is derived from the common law of trusts”). 
 130.  See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 52, at 524 (observing that “‘employers’ decisions to 
maintain and establish defined contribution plans are voluntary; if the costs of such plans 
outweigh the perceived benefits, employers will abandon such plans or will not establish them 
in the first place”). 
 131.  The courts’ decisions have been made partly to “help[] keep administrative and 
litigation expenses under control” so that such expenses do not “discourage employers from 
offering [ERISA] plans in the first place.” Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061, 1078 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (quoting Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1648 (2010)); see also Varity 
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (noting that “courts may have to take account of 
competing congressional purposes, such as Congress’ desire to offer employees enhanced 
protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and, on the other, its desire not to create a 
system that is so complex that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage 
employers from offering welfare benefit plans in the first place”). 
 132.  In the seminal case Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, the Supreme Court held 
that “principles of the law of trusts . . . establish that a denial of benefits . . . must be reviewed 
under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan expressly gives the plan administrator or 
05.SHNITSER.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/4/2016  6:38 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
666 
Consequently, courts have deferred to employer fiduciaries (by 
analogy to impartial donative trust trustees) on the interpretation of 
contested plan terms, even where employers have had a clear 
financial interest in such interpretations and even where the 
participants have claimed that plan fiduciaries breached their duties 
of prudence or loyalty. 133 
At the same time, the delegation of investment selection to 
individual participants has challenged the courts to determine the 
scope and nature of the plan sponsor’s remaining fiduciary liability. 
In the wake of class-action lawsuits against several large employers, 
the courts have sought to determine the plan sponsors’ fiduciary 
obligations with respect to the selection and oversight of investment 
and administrative service providers.  
The judicial focus to date has been on process and disclosure. 
Provided that adequate disclosure has been made and the employer’s 
process for selecting funds was not unreasonable,134 courts have 
 
fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the plan’s 
terms, in which cases a deferential standard of review is appropriate.” 489 U.S. 101, 102 
(1989) (emphasis added). Not surprisingly, subsequent plans’ sponsors have ensured the 
availability of the deferential standard of review by drafting the plan documents to grant the 
required discretion to the plan administrators. Importantly, however, the deferential review in 
trust law is premised on decision making by disinterested fiduciaries. ERISA, however, explicitly 
authorizes nonneutral fiduciaries with dual loyalties. Plan sponsors routinely have their own 
employees and management personnel serving in fiduciary capacities for the retirement plans. 
See Langbein, supra note 76, at 213. The only limit the Firestone Court imposed on deferential 
review was that a reviewing court must consider a fiduciary’s actual conflict of interest as a 
factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008) (holding that “circumstances” should be taken into account in 
evaluating the presence of the conflict but refusing to provide further guidance on the 
conflicts of interest). 
 133.  For a survey of the conflicts of interest and the relevant case law, see Maher & Stris, 
supra note 83, at 471–73; Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit 
Claim Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1083, 1146–52 (2001). See also Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae, On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823 
(2014) (No. 13-550) (“Post-Firestone, there is some confusion in the circuits on the question 
whether deferential review applies to a claim of breach of the duties of loyalty or prudence, 
where the claim turns on plan interpretation and the plan grants the administrator 
discretionary authority.”). 
 134.  Only in extreme cases have disclosure and process been held to be inadequate. In 
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., for example, the complaint attacked the plan’s mutual funds 
on multiple substantive grounds (alleging that they charged unnecessarily high fees, 
underperformed available alternatives, offered expensive retail shares instead of cheaper 
institutional shares, and charged marketing fees that did not benefit participants). 588 F.3d 
585, 600 (8th Cir. 2009). The Eighth Circuit’s reversal was based on the disclosure issue. The 
plaintiffs alleged that mutual funds were included in their plans because such funds made 
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permitted investment menus to include “expensive” investment 
options alongside diversified offerings of less expensive alternatives.135 
In Hecker v. Deere & Co., for example, the Seventh Circuit rejected 
an excessive fee claim because the plan in question offered more 
than twenty mutual funds, including some with low fees, and also 
allowed participants to select from over two thousand other funds 
through a brokerage service.136 Although the “large menu” defense 
has since lost some favor, as currently interpreted by courts, the 
trust-based legal regime for 401(k) plans demands that plan 
fiduciaries select, via a reasonably well-documented process, 
investment options and service providers that are not, and do not 
become, significantly or uniformly more expensive than industry 
norms.137 The recent wave of lawsuits reveals the challenges that 
even large, sophisticated employers face in meeting this basic 
standard.138 And while the high dollar settlement amounts have 
certainly piqued plan sponsor attention, such enforcement 
strategies are not practical for the vast majority of smaller 
 
payments to the plan trustee and administrator. Id. The Eighth Circuit agreed that information 
about revenue sharing could be material because it “could influence a reasonable participant in 
evaluating his or her options under the Plan.” Id. In Tibble, the Ninth Circuit focused on the 
menu selection process in evaluating the prudence of the trustees’ decision to include retail-
class shares of three specific mutual funds as investment options. In the absence of any 
evidence that, as a matter of process, the fiduciaries considered the possibility of cheaper, but 
otherwise similar, institutional classes for the funds, the court found the trustees in breach of 
the fiduciary duty of prudence. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 135.  See, e.g., Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 327–28 (3d Cir. 2011) (“In light 
of the reasonable mix and range of investment options in the Unisys plan, plaintiffs’ factual 
allegations about Unisys’s conduct do not plausibly support their claims.”); Loomis v. Exelon 
Corp., 658 F.3d 667, 673–74 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[The plan sponsor] offered participants a 
menu that includes high-expense, high-risk, and potentially high-return funds, together with 
low-expense index funds that track the market, and low-expense, low-risk, modest-return bond 
funds. It has left choice to the people who have the most interest in the outcome, and it 
cannot be faulted for doing this.”). 
 136.  Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 586 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that because 
the plan sponsor disclosed to the participants the total fees for the funds and directed the 
participants to the fund prospectuses for information about the fund-level expenses, the 
omission of information about the revenue-sharing arrangement was not material). 
 137.  See, e.g., Stephen D. Rosenberg, Retreat from the High Water Mark: Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty Claims Involving Excessive Fees After Tibble v. Edison International, 18 J. 
PENSION BENEFITS 12 (2011). 
 138.  See 401(k) Fee Cases, supra note 101. 
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retirement plans and do little to ameliorate the limits of the 
fiduciary obligation in the face of employer self-interest.139  
c. Employee complacency, lock-in, and lack of coordination. In 
addition to the problems described above, the current fiduciary-
centric regime may have the perverse consequence of making 
employees more complacent and less vigilant of their “fiduciary” 
employers, even though such “fiduciaries” may lack the necessary 
expertise or have economic interests that conflict with the interests 
of the employees.140 At the same time, even if employees were more 
vigilant, their enforcement options are limited as litigation is itself 
costly and requires employees to overcome significant free-rider and 
coordination problems.141 Employees receive limited support from 
the Department of Labor, which, in light of resource constraints, has 
chosen to focus its enforcement efforts on breaches of objective 
criteria, while leaving the higher-risk litigation over the “subjective” 
fiduciary standards to private litigants.142 
Apart from employee litigation or agency oversight, the 
employees of an employer who does not comply with ERISA’s 
fiduciary requirements have no meaningful recourse. As the trust 
“beneficiaries,” they are effectively locked in to their employer plans 
and cannot avail themselves of alternative investment options 
 
 139.  See, e.g., Sara Randazzo, Boeing Agrees to Settle 401(k) Plan Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., 
(Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-agrees-to-pay-57-million-to-settle-401-
k-plan-lawsuit-1446739640 (noting that Boeing’s $57 million settlement is the ninth 
settlement that a single plaintiff’s firm has reached with large companies, resulting in more 
than $271 million in payouts). 
 140.  See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 900 
(2011) (warning that an overbroad application of fiduciary duties “could unnecessarily 
constrain parties from self-protection in contractual relationships, impose excessive litigation 
costs, provide an unsuitable basis for contracting, and impede developing fiduciary norms 
of behavior”). 
 141.  The class action and contingent fee mechanisms, though used against certain large 
employers, may not be as effective for smaller employers where aggregate recoveries would be 
smaller. See Sitkoff, supra note 10, at 580 (observing that “when liability rules are the chief 
check on agency costs, there is a practical limit to the number of residual claimants that the 
organization can effectively support. The greater the number, the more serious the collective 
action dynamic that will weaken the incentive to monitor and then to bring litigation”). 
 142.  Muir, supra note 60. As Muir acknowledges, the subjective and flexible nature of 
the fiduciary standard enables it to serve as a kind-of regulatory “catchall.” These same 
features, however, also make litigation over fiduciary standards relatively unpredictable 
and costly. Id. 
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without losing the tax benefits currently afforded to employer-
sponsored plans.143 
B. Public Pension Plans 
This Section turns to public pension plans. Structuring the 
governance of public pension plans by analogy to private gratuitous 
trusts ignores the economic realities of the relevant parties. Unlike 
donative trust settlors, whose interests typically terminate upon trust 
creation, the state and local governments that sponsor the pension 
plans have ongoing interests in the pension trusts. They set the 
payouts from the trusts, contribute assets into the trusts, decide on 
certain investment parameters, and select and replace the trustees. 
They reap personnel retention benefits from having the pension 
plans, and also benefit if the successful investment of trust assets 
reduces funding obligations. Employee participants, meanwhile, 
benefit from trust payouts but also contribute their own assets into 
the pension trusts. Public pension trustees, unlike their donative 
trust counterparts, are replaced on an ongoing basis, often by 
legislative appointment and occasionally by participant election. 
The mismatch between the legal framework and the parties’ 
economic interests has undermined the effectiveness of trust-based 
governance for public pensions, particularly with respect to the 
funding of such trusts. Although U.S. pension trusts currently have 
assets in excess of $2.4 trillion, the promised payouts exceed, by 
conservative estimates, $3.2 trillion.144 The funding gaps have 
strained state and local government budgets—in some cases 
 
 143.  A recent Wall Street Journal article emphasizes the lack of employee recourse over 
poor employer decisions. See Liam Pleven, How to Lobby for a Better 401(k), WALL ST. J., (Feb. 
20, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-lobby-for-a-better-401-k-1424459507 
(observing that while “many plans are hobbled by high fees and inadequate choices . . . few 
people want to question the judgment of people who sign their paycheck and control 
promotions and raises”). 
 144.  Other estimates paint an even bleaker financial picture, estimating unfunded 
liabilities for such plans to be as high as $5 trillion. Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, The 
Crisis in Local Government Pensions in the United States, in GROWING OLD: PAYING FOR 
RETIREMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL MONEY MANAGEMENT AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
(Yasuyuki Fuchita et al. eds., 2011); see also Josh Rauh, Unfunded Pension Debts of U.S. States 
Still Exceed $3 Trillion, FORBES (Aug. 25, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/pensionresearchcouncil/2015/08/25/unfunded-pension-
debts-of-u-s-states-still-exceed-3-trillion/. 
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precipitating municipal bankruptcy—and have spurred a wide range 
of reform efforts.145 
The funding gap is, at least in part, the product of ongoing 
“settlor” control over the pension trusts. In a typical donative trust, 
after the settlor selects the trustee, the settlor relinquishes all legal 
rights to the trust property and transfers control to the trustee. In 
the case of public pension plans, however, even though the trustees 
are charged with plan administration, the legislative “settlors” retain 
a great deal of discretion over the trusts. State legislatures may 
increase future payouts, withhold contributions, or dictate particular 
investment strategies, but as the “settlors” of the pension trusts, they 
do not have any fiduciary obligation to the plan participants or 
beneficiaries.146 Thus, some public employers have extended pension 
promises to public employees while habitually skipping the necessary 
contributions into the pension trusts, thereby ensuring that 
promised payouts from the trusts exceed the available assets.147 
The plan trustees, meanwhile, have done little to stop them. 
Notwithstanding their fiduciary obligations to the plan participants 
and beneficiaries, public plan trustees lack the incentives to challenge 
“settlor” decisions about the inflows and outflows of assets from the 
trusts.148 On the one hand, many of the trustees must answer to the 
 
 145.  Vallejo, Central Falls, Stockton, Mammoth Lakes, and Detroit filed for bankruptcy 
in part due to the burden of pension obligations. See, e.g., Elizabeth Trotta, Stockton Teeters on 
Bankruptcy Edge, But City’s Not Alone, EXCHANGE (June 27, 2012, 3:00 PM), 
http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/the-exchange/%20stockton-teeters-bankruptcy-edge-city-
not-alone-190026487.html. In the same period, most states scaled back pensions for new 
employees, and a number of states reduced pension obligations to current employees and 
retirees. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-322, STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT PENSION PLANS: ECONOMIC DOWNTURN SPURS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS COSTS 
AND SUSTAINABILITY (2012). 
 146.  Although the trustees generally control the investment of pension trust assets, 
certain investment parameters may be set in state statutes, thus restricting trustee discretion. In 
particular, to the extent that legislators assume a high rate-of-return on plan assets (which, if 
met, would decrease employer funding obligations), the trustees are effectively bound to 
investment strategies that expose plan assets to a relatively high degree of risk. See, e.g., Josh 
Barro, Why Government Pension Funds Became Addicted to Risk, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/upshot/why-government-pension-funds-became-
addicted-to-risk.html?_r=0. 
 147.  STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT (2012), 
http://www.statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms; see also Shnitser, supra note 64. 
 148.  Isolated cases have held that pension trustees breach their fiduciary duties by not 
protesting legislative “raids” on pension trust funds. Kaho`ohanohano v. State, 114 Haw. 302, 
325 (2007) (citing Brisnehan v. Cent. Bank & Trust Co., 299 P.2d 113, 115 (Colo. 1956)) 
(“It is within the power, and is the duty, of a trustee to institute action and proceedings for the 
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state legislators who appoint them and who have their own interests 
in the pension trusts, interests that may not always align with those 
of public employees. On the other hand, to the extent that public 
pensions are still defined benefit plans that promise fixed payouts to 
the participants, the trustees may reason that beneficiaries are not 
immediately harmed by poor funding practices.149 It is not terribly 
surprising, therefore, that public plan trustees have rarely challenged 
legislative attempts to withhold promised contributions or to 
otherwise decrease the funded status of the trusts. Thus, the 
fiduciary regime has been of limited consequence in ensuring that 
promised payouts match available assets. 
The fiduciary regime has likewise failed to ensure public trustee 
monitoring of investment expenses. While the adoption of 
diversification and prudence standards has limited investment 
decisions based on factors other than financial returns to the plan, 
public plan trustees have also demonstrated complacency with 
respect to the investment expenses incurred by public pension plans. 
There is growing evidence that as public plans have pursued 
increasingly complex and costly investment strategies, they have 
underperformed market benchmarks.150 
 
protection of the trust estate and the enforcement of claims and rights belonging thereto, and 
to take all legal steps which may be reasonably necessary with relation to those objectives.”); 
Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816 (W. Va. 1988) (“[F]ailure of the Respondent Trustees to 
act in the face of these illegal legislative maneuvers and their compliance in channeling pension 
trust dollars improperly into the general fund are breaches of their fiduciary duties.”). 
 149.  The recent financial crisis has challenged this notion to some extent. Faced with 
major funding gaps, most states have trimmed pension costs by increasing employee 
contributions, raising age and tenure requirements, adjusting benefit formulas, and reducing 
or terminating cost-of-living increases. See, e.g., NASRA, SELECTED APPROVED CHANGES TO 
STATE PUBLIC PENSIONS TO RESTORE OR PRESERVE PLAN SUSTAINABILITY (2015). 
 150.  See, e.g., Alexandra Stevenson, Calpers’s Disclosure on Fees Brings Surprise, and 
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/business/dealbook/calperss-disclosure-on-fees-
brings-surprise-and-scrutiny.html; Gretchen Morgenson, Pension Funds Can Only Guess at 
Private Equity’s Cost, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/business/pension-funds-can-only-guess-at-private-
equitys-cost.html; Editorial, New York’s Leaky Public Pension Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 
2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/opinion/new-yorks-leaky-public-pension-
funds.html; Gretchen Morgenson, How to Pay Millions and Lag Behind the Market, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/20/business/how-to-pay-
millions-and-lag-behind-the-market.html; Jenny Anderson, Pension Funds Still Waiting for Big 
Payoff From Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/03/business/03equity.html. 
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Employee oversight has also been lacking, even though public 
employees receive the pension benefits as a form of deferred 
compensation and are required to contribute portions of their 
salaries into the pension trusts. As contributors of assets into the 
trust, such employees are, under traditional trust principles, the 
“settlors” of the trusts. But because the current regulatory regime 
regards employees only as trust beneficiaries, public employees have 
limited control over the management of trust assets and lack exit 
rights from the trusts. At the same time, while the traditional 
donative trust gives locked-in beneficiaries the incentives to monitor 
the trustees, the public pension arrangement dilutes the incentives 
for any such oversight. To the extent that public pension plans 
purport to shelter employees from both the upside and the downside 
of trustee management, the employees, though unable to sell or 
transfer their interests, have limited incentives to actively monitor the 
funding and investment decisions made for the plan. 
The courts have been reluctant to enforce any kind of funding 
discipline. Participant lawsuits challenging legislative and executive 
acts that decreased funding levels have been repeatedly struck 
down.151 The primary rationale has been that beneficiaries may be 
entitled to specific benefits but are not entitled to any specific 
funding methods or levels.152 Courts have held that participants have 
 
 151.  See, e.g.¸ New Jersey Educ. Ass’n v. State, 989 A.2d 282 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2010) cert. denied, 997 A.2d 232 (N.J. 2010) (holding that although pension funding statutes 
contained the word “shall” with respect to contribution amounts to be paid by the state, the 
employees did not have a constitutionally protected contract right to the funding method 
adopted by the legislature). In 2011, the state legislature added a statutory requirement that 
the legislature make a specific annual contribution to state pension plans. After the governor 
twice reduced the state contributions, plan members sued. The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
struck down the statutory provision for violating the Debt Limitation Clause of the New Jersey 
Constitution. See also Jones v. Bd. of Tr. of Ky. Ret. Sys., 910 S.W.2d 710 (1995) (holding that 
the legislation creating the retirement system created an inviolable contract between members 
and the state for the provision of retirement benefits, but it did not deny the General Assembly 
the ability to determine the means in providing the pension funds); People ex rel. Ill. Fed’n of 
Teachers v. Lindberg, 326 N.E.2d 749 (Ill. 1975) (holding that neither the Illinois 
constitutional provision that membership in state pension or retirement system shall be an 
enforceable contractual relationship the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired 
nor the Pension Code established contractual right to enforce specific level of funding or 
precluded governor’s item reduction of appropriations to the pension funds). 
 152.  In Burgos v. State, the court distinguished its rejection of a statutory funding 
scheme from a recent Supreme Court of Illinois decision that struck down a reduction of 
pension benefits. 118 A.3d 270, 283 (N.J. 2015) cert. denied sub nom. New Jersey Educ. Ass’n 
v. New Jersey, 136 S. Ct. 1156 (2016) and cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1156 (2016).  
05.SHNITSER.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/4/2016  6:38 PM 
629 Trusts No More 
 673 
no standing to challenge particular funding strategies unless there is 
an imminent risk to their benefits.153 
At present, U.S. public pension plans face serious long-term 
funding shortages and critical questions about the security of 
promised benefits.154 Although the future of public pensions is 
uncertain, public employers are beginning to experiment with 
alternative arrangements that follow the private sector in shifting 
funding and investment risk to employees.155 As the economic 
realities of retirement savings shift, the legal regime for such savings 
can no longer reflect the pension arrangements that existed half a 
century ago. 
V. ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES FOR RETIREMENT SAVINGS 
In light of the shortcoming of trust-based governance discussed 
above, this Section turns to a consideration of long-term reforms to 
promote retirement security in the Unites States. As the defined 
contribution model gains traction for both public and private sector 
employees,156 the challenge for policymakers is to foster universal 
 
 153.  In People ex rel., Sklodowski v. State, 695 N.E.2d 374 (Ill. 1998), the court observed 
that a beneficiary need not wait until benefits are actually diminished to bring suit under the 
protection clause of the state constitution, but would have to show that the funds are “on the 
verge of default or imminent bankruptcy such that benefits are in immediate danger of being 
diminished.” In Kaho‘ohanohano v. State, 162 P.3d 696 (Haw. 2007), the court suggested that 
employees would have to show that they have “not received any pension benefit to which he 
or she is entitled” or an “immediate threat that the pension fund will become insolvent” 
(quoting Ret. Bd. of the Emps. Ret. Sys. of Providence v. Cianci, 722 A.2d 1196, 1198 
(R.I. 1999).  
 154.  See, e.g., Mary Walsh Williams, Bankruptcy Judge in California Challenges Sanctity 
of Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/01/judge-
rules-that-bankruptcy-invalidates-calpers-lien-against-stockton-calif/; Alan Greenblatt, Deal In 
Detroit Could Signal Cuts To Pensions Elsewhere, NPR (July 22, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/07/22/334054904/deal-in-detroit-could-signal-cuts-to-
pensions-elsewhere. 
 155.  See, e.g., Alicia H. Munnell et al., Defined Contribution Plans in the Public Sector: 
An Update, CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLLEGE (Apr. 2014), 
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/SLP_37.pdf. 
 156. See Matthew Hoops, Irina Stefanescu & Ivan Vidangos, Defined-Contribution 
Pension Plans for State and Local Government Employees in the Financial Accounts of the United 
States, FEDS NOTES (Apr. 20, 2015), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2015/defined-contribution-
pension-plans-for-state-and-local-government-employees-20150420.html (observing that 
“401(k)-style defined-contribution (DC) plans have increasingly become available to S&L 
government employees”); John Beshears et al., Behavioral Economics Perspectives on Public 
Sector Pension Plans, 10 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 315 (2011) (noting that “fiscal pressures 
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access to low-cost retirement savings products that will help U.S. 
workers accumulate adequate assets for retirement.157 Section V.A. 
begins by reviewing prior academic recommendations, as well as 
recent state and federal government reforms, that seek to realign 
employer, employee, and government responsibilities in the 
provision of retirement and healthcare benefits. Although the various 
fixes appear quite different on first glance, a closer review suggests 
that they all seek to move away from the donative trust paradigm, 
and to limit employer discretion in the provision and administration 
of pension and welfare benefits. Building on the themes from prior 
proposals, the lessons from the regulation of investment companies, 
and the insights from behavioral economics, Section V.B. outlines a 
proposal—and a research agenda—for an alternative regulatory 
framework for retirement savings in the United States. 
A. A Range of Current Reform Proposals with a Common Theme 
The starting point for any consideration of reform must be the 
federal subsidization of retirement benefits. With federal tax 
expenditures for retirement programs exceeding $100 billion in 
2013, there is a clear role for the federal regulation of retirement 
savings.158 The critical questions pertain to the scope and the form of 
federal regulation and, accordingly, to the magnitude of necessary 
reform. Prior academic proposals vary across all of these dimensions. 
Some advocate for greater federal regulation of pension plans 
through additional rules mandating certain investments or 
disclosures, or, in the extreme, requiring mandatory employer and 
employee contributions to individual retirement accounts.159 Others 
 
are likely to generate more movement” toward defined contribution plans in the public 
sector). Furthermore, Edward Zelinsky observes that “any program for the future must start 
with the acknowledgment that the private retirement system going forward will predominantly 
reflect the defined contribution paradigm.” See supra note 52, at 523. 
 157.  The proposed framework would not address the existing underfunding of public 
pension plans but would help prevent the accumulation of such unfunded liabilities in 
the future. 
 158.  STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017 (2013). 
 159.  See Kwak, supra note 87 (proposing to limit the 404(c) safe harbor to “plans that 
only include low-cost index funds”); Ayres & Curtis, supra note 87, at 1522 (recommending 
that “plans with average plan and fund level costs that exceed the average expense ratios of a 
mixed portfolio of index funds by 125 basis points” be labeled as “high-cost” plans); Teresa 
Ghilarducci, Our Ridiculous Approach to Retirement, Op. Ed., N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2012 
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suggest stronger enforcement through enhanced fiduciary 
obligations for plan trustees160 or certain exit rights for 
beneficiaries.161 Still others advocate for the shifting of fiduciary 
responsibility away from individual employers and onto third-party 
financial service providers162 or separate entities established to 
administer plans on behalf of multiple employers.163 In the public 
sphere, proposals advocate for stronger “fiscal constitutions” to 
ensure the disciplined funding of promised pension benefits164 or the 
outsourcing of long-term pension liabilities to private 
insurance companies.165 
At the same time, both state and the federal government are 
pursuing alternatives to employer-based health and retirement 
benefits. While ERISA imposes the same trust-based framework on 
health and pension benefits, the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act of 2010 (PPACA) signals an important departure from 
ERISA’s trust-based approach, whose fiduciary standards proved 
grossly ineffective in regulating the administration of employer-
sponsored welfare plans.166 The PPACA limits employer discretion 
 
(proposing a system of mandatory “guaranteed retirement accounts on top of Social Security,” 
which would be “professionally managed, come with a guaranteed rate of return and pay 
out annuities”). 
 160.  See Adams, supra note 86, at 358; Muir, supra note 86, at 552; Tucker, supra note 
86, at 215. 
 161.  Ayres & Curtis, supra note 87, at 1519–20 (arguing that employees should have an 
avenue to withdraw from “high-cost” plans). 
 162.  See, e.g., Muir, supra note 61, at 55 (drawing on the Australian experience to 
recommend that “fiduciary responsibility for default investments be reallocated from 
employers to the financial services firms that offer those investment vehicles”). Importantly, 
however, it is not clear that the mere imposition of the fiduciary label in this context would be 
sufficient to constrain the behavior of financial services firms. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, 
Brokers as Fiduciaries, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 439, 442 (2010) (“At bottom, the fiduciary label 
just does not fit a sales-based industry very well.”). 
 163.  Sean Forbes, Senate HELP Subcommittee Hearing on Small-Business Retirement 
Plan Options, 42 PENS. & BEN. REP. 1897 (2015) (summarizing congressional testimony in 
favor of multiple employer plans (MEPs) that, as separate entities, would take on fiduciary 
liability for plans covering participating employers). 
 164.  Amy B. Monahan, State Fiscal Constitutions and the Law and Politics of Public 
Pensions, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 117, 117 (2015) (advocating for the creation of “enforcement 
mechanisms that can, where appropriate, override legislative decisions to underfund public 
pension plans”). 
 165.  See, e.g., The Secure Annuities for Employees Retirement Act, S. 1270, 113th 
Cong. (2013). 
 166.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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over healthcare benefits while harnessing technology to give 
individuals the tools to understand and compare insurance plans. 
The federal government has also recently introduced the 
“myRA” retirement savings vehicle, a product that U.S. Treasury 
Department has marketed to “people looking for a simple, safe, and 
affordable way to start saving for retirement.”167 The myRA is free to 
open, has no asset minimum, no fees, and permits investment in only 
one type of government securities.168 Although the program is not 
likely to have a big impact in terms of asset value—only $15,000 can 
be saved through the myRA—it represents a critical departure from 
the ERISA framework.169 Most notably, the myRA is available 
irrespective of one’s employment status and limits employer 
participation to the remittance of payroll deductions.170 
At the state level, there has been rapidly growing momentum for 
state-sponsored retirement savings plans for non-public employees 
without access to employer-sponsored plans.171 Although the 
proposals vary in the exact mechanics, in general, all seek to provide 
a state-administered plan for private-sector employees172 Like federal 
healthcare reform and the myRA effort, the state-level reforms aim 
to disentangle access to retirement savings plans from employment 
status and from the preferences of particular employers. In 2015, the 
Department of Labor expressed its support for such programs, and 
for a variety of novel initiatives—including state marketplaces and 
state-administered multiple-employer plans—to increase employee 
coverage while limiting employer involvement.173  
Across both the proposed and enacted reforms, the common 
theme has been the limitation of employer discretion over the 
 
 167.  U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Get Answers: Frequently asked questions, downloads, and 
additional resources., MYRA, https://myra.gov/get-answers/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2015). 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  See, e.g., States as Innovators, GEO. U. CENTER FOR RETIREMENT INITIATIVES, 
http://cri.georgetown.edu/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2016) (noting that “since 2012, more than 
25 states have considered proposals to study or establish state sponsored plans.”). 
 172.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-556, FEDERAL ACTION 
COULD HELP STATE EFFORTS TO EXPAND PRIVATE SECTOR COVERAGE, (2015), 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-556. 
 173.  Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 
Fed. Reg. 72006 (proposed Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510); 
Interpretive Bulletin Relating to State Savings Programs that Sponsor or Facilitate Plans 
Covered by ERISA, 80 Fed. Reg. 71936 (2015). 
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provision and administration of health and retirement benefits. This 
theme reflects the growing recognition that neither private nor 
public employers are well-suited to take on the “settlor” or “trustee” 
roles that the current trust-based framework imposes on them (and 
certainly not both roles at once). Building on this theme, Section 
V.B. presents a proposal to restructure the employer, employee, and 
government roles in the provision and management of retirement 
assets. The aim is to ameliorate the shortcomings of the current 
system while preserving both the distinction with the Social Security 
system and the key elements of individual and employer choice. 
B. A Research Agenda for Long-Term Reforms 
In place of the current system of employer-sponsored plans 
administered by conflicted employer fiduciaries, this Article proposes 
a national system of individual retirement savings accounts to be 
regulated not by analogy to gift transfers, but increasingly as 
products subject to safety and standards regulation.174 The pillars of 
the new system would be (1) the elimination of employer 
intermediaries in plan creation and administration, (2) the 
standardization of investment products and associated expenses, and 
(3) the establishment of participant exit rights. Each new pillar of the 
system—and of the research agenda on pension reform175—is 
discussed in broad strokes below. 
 
 174.  Unlike the proposed state-level systems, a national system would preserve ERISA’s 
central goal of “avoid[ing] a multiplicity of regulation” in order to facilitate a “nationally 
uniform administration of employee benefit plans.” N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 646 (1995). 
 175.  Other countries’ experiences with individual account models, similar to the 
individual account model described herein, should be considered in further analysis. Sweden, 
Chile, the United Kingdom, and Canada, among others, have all adopted various forms of the 
individual-account defined-contribution model in which employers and employees make 
contributions into portable accounts for which the employees control the selection of service 
providers and investment options. See, e.g., OECD, IOPS Country Profiles – United Kingdom 
(Dec. 2009), http://www.iopsweb.org/resources/44875825.pdf; U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-556, FEDERAL ACTION COULD HELP STATE EFFORTS TO 
EXPAND PRIVATE SECTOR COVERAGE, (2015), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-
556.; Barbara E. Kritzer, Chile’s Next Generation Pension Reform, 68 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 69 
(2008); Annika Sundén, How Do Individual Accounts Work in the Swedish Pension System?, 
CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RES. AT B.C. (Aug. 2004); Facts and Myths About the Premium 
Pension, SWEDISH INV. FUND ASS’N (2013); Rick Baert, Canada Officially Launches Pooled 
DC Plans for Employees in Private Sector, Territories, PENSIONS & INVS. (Oct. 7, 2014); About 
Pooled Registered Pension Plans (PRPPs), CANADA REVENUE AGENCY (July 3, 2014), 
http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tx/rgstrd/prpp-rpac/bt-eng.html. 
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1. The elimination of employer intermediaries in plan creation 
and administration 
Pursuant to an individual account model, employers and 
employees would remit contributions to the employees’ federally 
established retirement savings accounts, which would segregate 
individual savings in a single account throughout an employee’s pre-
retirement years.176 Employers could continue to make dollar 
contributions on behalf of employees (a benefit that prospective 
employees could easily evaluate in assessing total compensation), but 
would only be required to facilitate employee contributions through 
payroll withholding. Employers would no longer serve as pension 
plan administrators, and thus would not have to invest any resources 
in or face any liability risk for the establishment or management of 
pension plans.177 The absence of such costs and liability risks would 
likely encourage contributions by a wide range of employers, 
including a significant portion of U.S. employers who do not 
currently sponsor any retirement plans. 
2. The standardization of investment products and associated expenses 
Under the proposed individual account model, individual 
participants would, as they do now, select particular investment 
funds for the assets in their retirement accounts. To harness the 
power of consumer choice with respect to retirement products, two 
key departures from the current model would be required. First, as 
described in the section below, participants would need the freedom 
to “exit” from particular investment funds. Secondly, and in order to 
 
 176.  Like current 401(k) type arrangements, the individual accounts would segregate 
such assets and protect them from employer or employee bankruptcy. 
 177.  How and by whom would the individual accounts be administered in the absence 
of employer intermediaries? Here, the experience of individual account systems outside the 
U.S. provides a spectrum of possible arrangements—with varying degrees of involvement by 
the federal government—to be analyzed in further research. On one end of the spectrum, the 
U.S. could pursue the Chilean model in which the management of individual retirement 
savings accounts would be delegated to private companies, a model that would also resemble 
the current U.S. approach to 529 college savings plans. Kritzer, supra note 175; I.R.C. § 529 
(2012). On the other end of the spectrum, the U.S. government, which already administers 
individual accounts for purposes of the Social Security system, could pursue the Sweden model 
in which the federal government would itself administer the individual accounts with the aim 
of keeping administrative costs down by drawing on economies of scale in administration. 
Sundén, supra note 175; Facts and Myths About The Premium Pension, supra note 175. 
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make individual participation feasible, the investment funds offered 
to participants would have to be standardized.178 
At present, employer intermediation limits standardization. 
Investment fund providers commonly seek to provide additional 
services to plan sponsors and seek compensation for such services 
through the increasingly complicated revenue and cost-sharing 
arrangements. Different employers have different service providers, 
different bundles of services, and different cost-sharing 
arrangements. The widely acknowledged result is that neither the 
employers nor the employees nor third-party observers can directly 
or accurately compare the total cost of the investment options across 
different employer plans.179 
Beyond eliminating employer intermediation, the individual 
account model would strive to simplify and standardize the 
investment products offered to individual account holders. Although 
further research is necessary to determine the appropriate size of the 
investment menu, at the outset, permissible investments could be 
limited primarily to mutual funds.180 Investment fund providers 
seeking to access retirement assets held in individual accounts would 
have to comply with standards concerning the structure of 
compensation arrangements, and with specific disclosure 
requirements with respect to fund fees and returns.181 Furthermore, 
the use of labels to certify particular types of investment products 
could aid participants, just as such labels permit consumers to shop 
 
 178.  See Sendhil Mullainathan, Why Investing Is So Complicated, and How to Make It 
Simpler, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2015 (observing that “standardization is what allows 
uninformed consumers to shop intelligently for complex products”). Mullainathan suggests 
that “for mutual funds, better standards and better labels could simplify choice. For example, 
suppose the label ‘Standard S&P 500 Index Fund’ was widely used to mean that the fund 
satisfied certain criteria about transparent pricing, low management fees and limits on trading 
costs. Consumers buying this fund would know what they were getting.” Id. 
 179.  See, e.g.¸ Maher, supra note 60, at 46–48 (describing the inability of prospective 
employees to effectively compare retirement packages across different employers). 
 180.  At their core, mutual funds are an inexpensive way for individual investors to own 
stakes in portfolios of securities, with at least half of U.S. households already holding shares in 
one or more mutual funds. See William A. Birdthistle, The Supreme Court’s Theory of the Fund, 
37 J. CORP. L. 771, 772 (2012). 
 181.  Sweden is a particularly compelling example in this regard. The total fee for 
individual accounts consists of just two parts: a money management fee and a fixed 
administrative fee charged by the federal agency. See Sundén, supra note 175; Facts And Myths 
About The Premium Pension, supra note 175. 
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for complex products outside the investment sphere.182 Finally, the 
existence of a uniform market for retirement savings products would 
foster the development of far more robust consumer ratings and 
reviews by third parties, as well as new technologies to assist with 
consumer decision-making.183 
3. The establishment of participant exit rights 
In a fundamental departure from the current trust-based model, 
the individual account model would no longer “lock in” participants 
into the plan menus selected by particular employers. Indeed, under 
the current structure, employee participants in employer-sponsored 
plans may be at a disadvantage relative to non-plan investors. 
Outside employer-sponsored plans, mutual fund investors who are 
unhappy with any aspect of the fund can exit by redeeming their 
shares for the cash value of the proportionate share of the underlying 
fund assets.184 Mutual fund managers are therefore judged by the 
forces of “consumer sovereignty.”185 As in other settings where the 
shareholders can vote with their feet, “[n]et inflows of money” serve 
as the perceived “proper metric for testing product quality”186 and 
 
 182.  Mullainathan, supra note 178. 
 183.  In recent years, start-ups seeking to help consumers assess the investment options in 
their 401(k)s have appeared on the market. The value of such companies, however, has been 
limited in light of the participant lock-in under the current trust-based structure. See, e.g., 
Catherine Shu, FeeX Raises $6.5M Series B To Identify Hidden Fees In Users’ Retirement 
Accounts, TECHCRUNCH.COM, (Aug. 21, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/08/21/feex-
raises-6-5m-series-b-to-identify-hidden-fees-in-users-retirement-accounts/; see also Uri 
Berliner, Would You Let A Robot Manage Your Retirement Savings?, NPR, (Oct. 30, 2015), 
http://www.npr.org/2015/10/20/445337189/would-you-let-a-robot-manage-your-
retirement-savings. 
 184.  Notably, though the majority of mutual funds are organized as trusts under state 
law, the exit options available to mutual fund investors alter the basic character of the trust and 
the incentives of the parties to the trust. Absent the lock-in that characterizes beneficiary 
interests in a donative trust, mutual fund investors are no longer dependent on fiduciary 
obligations to protect their interests from abuse by trustees. Nor do such investors have the 
incentives to exercise any kind of “corporate governance” type rights that the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 provides. Incentives to bring litigation against the fund are likewise very 
limited. Instead, given the low-cost of exit, investors in mutual funds who are unhappy with 
trustee performance (or costs) can simply redeem their shares and move their assets elsewhere. 
See generally Morley & Curtis, supra note 81, at 84. 
 185.  Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual 
Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1038 (2005). 
 186.  Id. 
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foster “a kind of product market competition.”187 Such competition 
is admittedly still imperfect,188 but in combination with product-style 
regulation to improve standardization and transparency, it has the 
potential to harness the disciplining power of consumer choice in the 
marketplace for financial investments. 
To be clear, the model proposed in this Article does not advocate 
for unrestricted or unguided individual control over the investment 
and accumulation of retirement assets.189 Rather, having shown that 
employers do not—and should not be expected to—act solely in the 
interest of their employees, the individual account framework aims to 
shift certain administrative and oversight functions to the federal 
government while simultaneously standardizing the underlying 
arrangements to foster effective competition among investment 
funds. As it has done in other countries, the aggregation of 
individual account information and centralized administration of 
such accounts would facilitate the analysis of investor behavior190 and 
experimentation with default rules and “nudges” to improve such 
behavior.191 Furthermore, as in other product markets, private-sector 
firms can be expected to utilize technological advances to provide 
sophisticated comparisons and ratings to guide consumer choice. 
Finally, whereas current employers do not wish to be in the business 
 
 187.  Morley & Curtis, supra note 81, at 89. 
 188.  Id. at 129–32. 
 189.  Several studies have documented that individual investors are subject to various 
behavioral biases. For a brief overview of relevant studies, see Ning Tang et al., The Efficiency 
of Sponsor and Participant Portfolio Choices In 401(K) Plans. 94 J. PUB. ECON. 1073 (2010); 
see also Brown et al., supra note 102. 
 190.  See, e.g., Johan Almenberg & Jenny Save-Söderbergh, Financial Literacy and 
Retirement Planning in Sweden, 10 J. PEN. ECON. & FIN. 585 (2011) (using data from the 
Swedish Financial Supervisory 2010 consumer survey to look at levels of financial literacy and 
retirement planning in the Swedish population). The consolidation of pension savings into a 
single account has also promoted awareness of pension savings in several European countries. 
See Iona Bain, Platform to Track Pensions Logical Step Forward: Report, FTADVISER, 
(Oct. 9, 2013). 
 191.  For example, the system could enable the comparison of individual performance to 
the investment performance of other participants (either from the same employer, of the same 
age, etc.). See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (advocating for a system of 
automatic enrollment and contribution increases, subject to employee opt-out). Both Chile 
and Sweden, for example, have adjusted the initial system design to improve default options 
and promote competition among investment product providers. See, e.g., International 
Update, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., (June 2010) (discussing the change in the default funds); Kritzer, 
supra note 175 (discussing changes to increase individual participation rates and improve 
competition among private pension fund management companies). 
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of educating employees about prudent investment practices,192 a 
federal account administrator or agency specifically tasked with 
improving retirement savings outcomes could engage in a much 
more significant education campaign.193 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Decades after the donative trust was adopted as the 
organizational model for the then prominent defined-benefit plans, 
this Article evaluates the suitability of the model for current 
retirement savings arrangements. The findings reveal that regulation 
by analogy to the donative trust is increasingly incoherent and 
incapable of ensuring that employees have access to sound 
investment opportunities for their retirement savings. At a time 
when the role of the employer with respect to the provision of 
various welfare benefits, including healthcare, is undergoing 
important changes, this Article calls for the limitation of the 
employer role in the structuring and management of pension 
benefits financed by employee earnings. As a long-term alternative, 
this Article proposes a framework for developing a national system of 
individual retirement savings accounts into which both employers 
and employees could continue to make tax-advantaged 
contributions. As they do now, individuals would control the 
selection of investments for the assets in their accounts, but they 
would do so in a marketplace that would facilitate direct comparison 
and competition among the investment products on which U.S. 
employees depend for a financially secure retirement. 
 
 192.  An employer who sponsors a participant-directed 401(k) plan is not required to 
provide educational materials on retirement savings and investing to the plan participants and 
employers generally fear the fiduciary liability that could attach in connection with the 
provision of investment education. See 15 No. 9 Thompson’s 401(k) Handbook Newsl. 2 
(observing that “many employers fear the liability that such financial education might create”).  
 193.  The U.S. Department of Treasury’s campaign to promote and educate the public 
about myRAs could be instructive. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Help Us Build a 
Nation of Savers, MYRA, https://myra.gov/partners/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2015). An 
education campaign could also be undertaken in coordination with or under the auspices of 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which is currently “weighing whether it should 
take on a role in helping Americans manage the $19.4 trillion they have put into retirement 
savings” See Carter Dougherty, Retirement Savings Accounts Draw U.S. Consumer Bureau 
Attention, BLOOMBERG.COM, Jan. 17, 2013. 
